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Introduction
Government increasingly leverages its regulatory function by embodying in law standards that are promulgated and copyrighted by nongovernmental organizations. Departures from such standards expose citizens
to criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions, yet private actors generate,
control, and limit access to them. Despite governmental ambitions, no one is
responsible for evaluating the legitimacy of this approach ex ante and no
framework exists to facilitate analysis. This Article contributes an analytical
framework and proposes institutional mechanisms to implement it.
The lack of a comprehensive framework for evaluating copyright to
standards embodied in law is surprising because the range of standards po1
tentially affected is large and growing. It includes standards relating to
accounting, consumer product safety, energy, government contracting, insurance, medicine, and telecommunications; codes for buildings,
corporations, and legal ethics; and manuals for stock exchange listings and
2
scores of others.
To illustrate, it is a violation of federal law for any person to file required financial statements with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) that are not in conformity with generally accepted accounting prin3
ciples (“GAAP”) or for auditors to attest to such financial statements unless
audited in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards
(“GAAS”). The SEC has enforced these laws in thousands of administrative
proceedings and hundreds of federal court cases asserting violations of
4
GAAP or GAAS or both. Yet these accounting standards are not freely
available to the public or to prosecuted persons. Instead, they are claimed to

1. Scholarship addressing standards tends to examine patents covering industry standards,
with particular attention to technology, not copyright addressed to narrative standards embodied in
law. E.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90
Cal. L. Rev. 1889 (2002); Janice M. Mueller, Patenting Industry Standards, 34 J. Marshall L.
Rev. 897 (2001); Mark R. Patterson, Inventions, Industry Standards, and Intellectual Property, 17
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1043 (2002).
2. See, e.g., National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTA) of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104-113, § 12(d), 110 Stat. 775, 783 (1996); cf. Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No.
92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972).
3. Federal securities statutes direct the SEC to establish requirements but do not require
using GAAP. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77s (2004). GAAP are embodied in public law
by SEC regulation, policy and enforcement actions. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01 (2005); Certification
of Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual Reports, Securities Act Release No. 8124, Exchange Act Release No. 46427, 78 SEC Docket 875 (Aug. 28, 2002).
4. Penalties include injunctions, disgorgement, fines, resignations, and imprisonment. See
Mark S. Beasley et al., Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987–1997, at 37–39 (1999).
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be copyrighted by the so-called “private” standard setters the SEC or Congress anoints to establish them.
This Article develops a three-part classification scheme to facilitate
analysis of the copyright eligibility of such works based on how privately
generated standards are embodied in public law. Otherwise copyrighteligible works can assume attributes of law potentially ineligible for copyright through three routes: by passing reference in legal materials (weak
form), by incorporation into law after creation (semi-strong form), or by ex
ante governmental designation of the standard setter as an officially recognized body (strong form). This Article’s framework facilitates analysis of all
private standards embodied in public law; its case study of accounting standards is especially useful because their complex generation process provides
illustrations of each class in this scheme.
Specifically, (a) contemporary auditing standards are generated by a recent congressionally created and publicly funded body (the Public Company
5
Accounting Oversight Board, “PCAOB”) (strong form route); (b) contemporary accounting principles are generated by a single SEC-recognized and
publicly funded body (the Financial Accounting Standards Board, “FASB”)
whose standards for three decades have been incorporated by the SEC (semi6
strong form route); and (c) auditing and accounting standards were set before
these bodies were created by a private not-for-profit professional association
(the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, “AICPA”) whose
7
standards were given the SEC’s imprimatur by reference (weak form route).
Generally, under the framework this Article proposes, copyright is
(a) not recognized in the strong form route; (b) recognized and generally
continued in the weak form route (subject to qualifying conventions such as
compulsory licensing and broadened fair use); and (c) derecognized in the
semi-strong form route when factors concerning the author, the work, the
copier, and the governmental relation to each bear features more akin to the
strong form than to the weak form. For accounting standards, this means
that PCAOB work cannot be copyrighted; AICPA work retains copyright,
subject to some qualifying conventions; and most FASB work becomes ineligible for copyright.
These copyright adjustments are necessary to provide requisite access to
standards. Otherwise, persons seeking access face considerable obstacles. In
the case of accounting standards, only the most straightforward portions are

5. PCAOB establishes auditing standards solely for use in audits of public companies (not
private enterprises, not-for-profit organizations, or governmental entities).
6. FASB establishes accounting standards for all entities producing financial statements for
external users other than governmental entities, including public companies, private enterprises and
not-for-profit organizations. Accounting for governmental entities is set by FASB’s sister organization the Governmental Accounting Standards Board, GASB (and, for the United States Government,
by the Federal Financial Accounting Standards Board, FFASB).
7. AICPA establishes accounting and auditing standards for use by all entities producing
audited financial statements for external users, including public companies, private enterprises, notfor-profit organizations, and governmental entities, though all of these are supplemental to standards
produced by PCAOB, FASB, GASB, and FFASB.
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available without charge on the Internet; others must be purchased from
standard setters. Those wishing to copy materials must apply for permission
and pay fees, which can require numerous inquiries of the standard setters
and consume months of diligent effort. Copiers must pay or risk lawsuits,
with nothing to rely upon but notoriously uncertain defenses to copyright
9
infringement claims.
Neither the laborious and costly processes nor related litigation uncertainty fit professional or legal needs of affected citizens. These systemic
infirmities also frustrate the work of later generators of standards seeking to
build upon predecessor works. In the case of accounting standards, moreover, none of these burdens is necessary because in 2002 Congress passed
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that provided PCAOB and FASB with funding for
100% of their respective budgets and stripped AICPA of power to produce
10
accounting standards for entities over which the SEC has jurisdiction.
These changes and the importance of accounting standards in governing
the legal position of millions of persons make examination of their copyright status timely. Moreover, given that accounting standards illustrate a
larger class of standards embodied in law, and that this class grows steadily,
the analysis is useful to resolve complex public policy trade-offs in the innumerable contexts in which privately promulgated standards are embodied
in public law.
Two matters of administrative law arise that this Article’s framework
also helps to analyze. First, embodying private standards in public law can
amount to abdication of lawmaking functions, violating traditional principles limiting lawmaker power to delegate this function to private parties.
Delegation risks should be insignificant in the weak form route because embodiment is limited and insignificant in the strong form route because the
promulgator is a recognized lawmaker. Delegation risks may be considerable in the semi-strong form route, however. Second, federal governmental
agencies may incorporate by reference private standards in public law without following requisite rulemaking procedures or publication requirements,
likely posing issues in semi-strong form cases but not in weak or strong
form circumstances.

8.
2005).

See, e.g., Financial Accounting Standards Board, http://www.fasb.org (last visited May 6,

9. Consider my experience seeking permission from accounting standard setters to copy
materials in a casebook called Law and Accounting for law school instruction. It took three months
to obtain permission and cost $3,000. Copyright lawyers advised that my choices were to pay the
fees or publish anyway and fight any infringement lawsuit by asserting defenses evaluated in this
Article. Being risk-averse, I paid the fees and skipped the lawsuit; as an academic, I wrote this Article. There are likely many persons like me in the former category; I have some company in the
latter. See Paul B.W. Miller & Paul R. Bahnson, Funding FASB, Acct. Today, June 17, 2002
(“FASB standards and publications essentially define legal constraints on practice; therefore, they
are part of the public record and must be readily accessible. . . . FASB’s practice of selling standards
is totally anachronistic. . . . We even had to pay [it] a permission fee to reprint brief excerpts from
pronouncements in our upcoming book. . . .”).
10. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 109, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) [hereinafter SOX].
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For the federal government, this Article proposes to require the Director of
the Federal Register to classify standards embodied in law according to this
Article’s three-part framework and to administer related copyright effects. It
also contemplates that the Director would police impermissible delegation of
lawmaking functions to private actors and ensure federal government entity
compliance with publication requirements. The proposed regulatory approach
to copyright consequences is necessary because of institutional limitations on
the federal judiciary’s competence to provide a comprehensive ex ante framework. Short of the regulatory solution, however, guidance developed in this
Article should aid courts in resolving disputes.
I. Three-Part Framework
Underlying aspects of the problem of copyright to standards embodied in
law are clear: legal materials are ineligible for copyright. Far less clear are the
more manifest aspects of the problem: legal doctrine governing copyright to
such standards is sparse, conflicting, and ad hoc.
A. Ancient Concepts
Since Roman times, a central feature of a law-based civilization has been
11
public access to legal materials. The ancient concepts were adopted early in
U.S. history when the Supreme Court announced in the classic cases of
12
13
Wheaton v. Peters and Banks v. Manchester that judicial opinions cannot be
protected by copyright. A critical rationale is that these opinions bind all citizens and so must be “free for publication to all” (what might somewhat
14
simply be called the public domain rationale). A related rationale is that
judges need no incentives to generate written legal opinions because this production function is an essential component of their work assignment (call this
15
the incentives rationale). The same rationales apply to legislative enactments,
16
making these likewise ineligible for copyright. These principles apply to all
17
judicial opinions and statutes constituting law, both federal and state. They

11. See 3 Will Durant, Story of Civilization: Caesar and Christ 31–32 (1944);
Peter Stein, Roman Law in European History 3–4 (1999).
12.

33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668 (1834).

13.

128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888).

14. Id. at 253; see Francine Biscardi, The Historical Development of the Law Concerning
Judicial Report Publication, 85 Law Libr. J. 531 (1993).
15. See County of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 179, 194 (2d Cir.
2001); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 518 (9th Cir. 1997), amended
by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952 (1998).
16.

See Nash v. Lathrop, 6 N.E. 559 (Mass. 1886).

17. See Robert P. Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological
Age 365 (2003); David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 5.12[A], at 5–91 (2004); L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and
Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 719, 751–58 (1989).
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encompass regulations and rules of administrative bodies and local govern19
mental entities.
In the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress furthered these ancient concepts
by extending relinquishment of claims to copyright for any work of the U.S.
20
government. Relinquishment does not reach works of other governmental
21
entities nor does it automatically extend to work that federal agencies
commission from independent contractors. In the latter context, the Copyright Act’s legislative history provides guidance to federal agencies. It
suggests that copyright would be (a) inappropriate when the independent
contractor produces work the agency could produce itself but (b) appropriate
when denying it “would be unfair or would hamper the production and pub22
lication of important works.” The issue is balancing the need for free
access to the work with the need of the private author to secure a copyright.
Thus, where government would be incapable of inducing the work’s produc23
tion except through copyright protection, copyright may be justified.
B. Modern Standards
Contemporary production of legal materials relies significantly and increasingly on private-sector standard setters, whose products are embodied
in law by legislatures, regulators, courts, and other governmental authori24
ties. Fitting these standards into the ancient concepts making law ineligible
for copyright is not as easy as declaring that legislative and judicial pro18.
(1986).
19.

See Federal Register Act, 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (2000); Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154
See County of Suffolk,, 261 F.3d at 179.

20. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2000). Section 101 defines “a work of the United States
Government” as “a work prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Government as
part of that person’s official duties.” Id. § 101. The rationale of the government works doctrine is an
extension of the rationale against copyright in judicial and legislative pronouncements, not that
allowing copyright in government works would make the public “pay twice” for these works. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property
Law 15 (2003).
21. See, e.g., County of Suffolk, 261 F.3d at 179; see also Marvin J. Nodiff, Copyrightability
of Works of the Federal and State Governments Under the 1976 Act, 29 St. Louis U. L.J. 91, 104
(1984). The pending Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act denies copyright protection to state and local governmental entities as well as the federal government. H.R.
3261, 108th Cong. § 5(a) (2003).
22. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 59 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5672. The
legislative history appears to guide federal agencies and Congress, not judicial interpretation of the
statute. Still, the guidance expresses federal congressional policy, so it should be legitimate for those
grappling with related policy questions to consider it. See infra note 119.
23.

See County of Suffolk, 261 F.3d at 194.

24. See, e.g., National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104113, 110 Stat. 775 (1996); U.S. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8545, 8555
(Feb. 19, 1998); see also Standards for Business Practices of Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines,
FERC Order No. 587-A, 77 FERC ¶ 61061 n.11 (Oct. 21, 1996). American National Standards
Institute (“ANSI”) boasts that the congressional policy is “having a dramatic impact upon the way
federal agencies do business in the standardization area.” ANSI, Significant Federal Laws and Policies, http://www.ansi.org/government_affairs/laws_policies/laws.aspx?menuid=6 (last visited May
25, 2005).
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nouncements are ineligible for copyright. Apart from ambiguity as to
whether they constitute law in the way legislation and court decisions do,
neither public domain concerns (of due process and free access) nor inherent incentives of lawmakers to produce law are as obvious. Even the
somewhat more involved balancing inquiry used to assess suitability of
copyright to government works prepared by independent contractors does
not readily resolve such cases.
A prominent illustration concerns municipalities adopting a privately
generated building code as law, as in Veeck v. Southern Building Code Con25
gress International, Inc.. The eight-member en banc majority emphasized
that legislative adoption rendered the code law and this, ipso facto, put it in
the public domain, ineligible for copyright. The six-member en banc dissent
(through two separate opinions) stressed the need to consider incentive effects of such a conclusion on future production of kindred materials. Each
side recognized the legitimacy of the other’s argument: the dissenters observed that the case raised no due process or free access issues (the copier
was neither charged with nor prosecuted for any violation of law) and the
majority observed that no incentives were upset because the private standard
setter in question promulgated standards principally for the purpose of get26
ting them enacted into law.
Dividing the majority and dissents in Veeck was also disagreement as to
the proper role of intermediate federal appellate courts in resolving such a
profound issue of public policy (not merely of law, but posing novel legal
issues in a complex public policy context). Thus, while all the court’s judges
appeared to accept the basic policy stakes as pitting public domain concerns
against incentive effects on production, they emphasized different aspects of
these competing policy objectives.
What makes Veeck a difficult case is that the standards at issue were
adopted (a) formally rather than in passing and (b) in full long after their
promulgation. Point (a) made it difficult for the majority to shrug off adoption as one might a passing judicial reference to a professional standard in a
negligence case; point (b) made it difficult for the dissent to accept the impaired incentives entailed by copyright vitiation upon the code’s adoption as
law. This combination of points marks relatively easier cases at each end of
the spectrum: (1) passing reference in legal materials to standards does not
make standards law with copyright-destroying effects (even Veeck’s majority
makes this clear) and (2) formal ex ante anointment of an organization to
prepare standards bearing binding legal effects can destroy copyright (even
Veeck’s dissents appear to accept this, certainly when due process issues
arise).
A three-part classification scheme thus emerges, as both a descriptive
and normative matter. The classes within the threefold classification scheme
25. Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert.
denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003). Only three other federal appellate cases exist, none adjudicated by the
Supreme Court. See infra Section I.C.
26.

Veeck, 293 F.3d at 805.
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by which standards become embodied in law may be called for convenience:
weak form, semi-strong form, and strong form. Descriptively, this framework derives from reconciling judicial opinions in cases like Veeck;
normatively, it enables capturing the important factors relevant to conducting requisite public policy balancing inquiries: the author’s identity, the
nature of the work, the identity and nature of the copier, and the relation of
the governmental entity to the author, work, and copier. Consider some illustrations.
Standards take the weak form route into law by reference, as when
courts admit authoritative materials into evidence to evaluate a defendant’s
potential liability. Judicial references to Gray’s Anatomy to help define a
27
physician’s standard of care do not destroy copyright in that work. The
author and the work are autonomous from any governmental action and the
governmental use arises in a discrete context. Derecognizing copyright is
not necessary as a due process matter because the referenced text does not
formally bind all or a class of citizens ex ante but is used in a particular judicial evaluation; letting such judicial use vitiate copyright in particular
works would destroy copyright altogether, eliminating all incentives copyright offers.
This class is as widespread as the legal regime it ultimately but indirectly serves—and is growing in size as more standards are embodied in
law. Critical to traditional jurisprudential recognition of such references,
however, is both their authoritative status and their accessibility. As this
class of standards embodied in law grows, these attributes assume greater
social significance, requiring more formal assurance that the standards are
widely available to affected persons.
The semi-strong form route occurs through adoption when, as in Veeck,
a legislative body formally enacts a standard as law. As the split court in
Veeck attests, this context poses considerable difficulties. The author may or
may not seek to contribute his work to the fabric of law, the work itself may
or may not assume characteristics of a law-like codification, and the governmental interest in it may be expressed by wholesale adoption or cut-andpaste adaptation. Difficult issues arise from these differences in the exercise
of balancing free access and due process on the one hand with the incentive
effects on prospective producers of such standards on the other. This class
can be sizable, including, for example, the American Bar Association’s
Model Code of Professional Responsibility adopted by many state supreme
courts and promulgations of the Gas Industry Standards Board embodied in
28
regulations of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
The strong form route of standards-into-law arises by ordainment, as
where a governmental authority anoints a designated standard setter to pro27.

Cf. Freshwater v. Scheidt, 714 N.E.2d 891, 896 n.2 (Ohio 1999) (citations omitted).

28. See infra note 207; see also Standards for Business Practices of Interstate Natural Gas
Pipelines, 61 Fed. Reg. 39,053 (July 17, 1996); Standards for Business Practices of Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines, 61 Fed. Reg. 19,211 (May 1, 1996); Michael Ariens, The Ethics of Copyrighting
Ethics Rules, 36 U. Tol. L. Rev. 235 (2005).
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duce materials the authority itself could produce. This is the functional
equivalent of legislative enactment. In contrast to weak form adoption, this
is an outright assignment of the task and comprehensive embrace of the
work to bind all those to whom the legal, regulatory, and standard-setting
framework speaks; in contrast to semi-strong form adoption, those features
negate incentive concerns. This class appears likely to have few members at
present, but could become an increasingly appealing governmental policy
29
option.
A distinguishing feature of this class of strong form standards-into-law
is how standards form the corpus of the law governing those addressed.
They do not merely inform the legal basis for negligence and other transgressions to which passing references (weak form adoption) may be applied,
but constitute the fabric of that law. As a result, covered persons need
knowledge of these standards to comply with law, as do lawyers advising
them. In these respects, such materials are de facto law. The source of this
distinguishing feature is formal legislative and administrative anointment of
the body as an official legal standard setter, needing none of the incentives
that copyright provides.
These descriptive illustrations can be summarized abstractly. Component variables reveal the ultimate policy tension as balancing incentive
needs with access needs. Conceptually, the framework relates trade-off relativity as follows: weak form embodiment circumstances are characterized
by greater incentive needs for producers and lesser access needs for users
while strong form embodiment circumstances are characterized by lesser
incentive needs for producers and greater access needs for users (semistrong embodiment circumstances are characterized by needs of intermediate orders). The figure below summarizes.

29.

See infra Section III.A.
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As to author identity and the nature of a work, private actors producing
materials for purposes other than embodiment in law epitomize the weak
form route (non-copyright incentives may be low), while officially anointed
actors creating standards for embodiment in law epitomize the strong form
route (non-copyright incentives suffice). As to user identity, persons who are
members of a class affected by a standard embodied in law signal the strong
form route (class access is critical), while randomly affected persons associate with the weak form route (public access is not compelling). The
governmental relation to each likewise drives towards the strong form route
when government’s role is consciously a lawmaking function and towards
the weak form route in opposite cases. The generality of this framework can
be seen initially by reviewing existing judicial doctrine, sparse and ad hoc
30
though it is.
C. Judicial Doctrine
The Supreme Court has yet to address the copyright consequences of
privately promulgated standards embodied in public law. Only four federal
appellate court opinions address the context. Three of these decline to treat
such embodiment as vitiating copyright—Veeck is the exception and also the

30. See Maryjane Boone Bonfield, Casenote, Veeck v. SBCCI, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002),
56 SMU L. Rev. 1025 (2003); Katie M. Colendich, Comment, Who Owns “The Law”? The Effect
on Copyrights when Privately Authored Works are Adopted or Enacted by Reference into Law, 78
Wash. L. Rev. 589 (2003); Shubha Ghosh, Copyright as Privatization: The Case of Model Codes,
78 Tul. L. Rev. 653 (2004); Robert Kry, Case Note, The Copyright Law, 111 Yale L.J. 761 (2001);
Nick Martini, Note, Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc., 18 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 93 (2003).
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31

most recent. A review suggests basic components of the doctrinal terrain to
which more complex elaborations are developed in the rest of this Article.
The review of judicial doctrine reveals the appeal of this Article’s threepart classification scheme as a descriptive matter, being derivable from the
cases; the review also supports its normative aspects, being analytically defensible to think through policy trade-offs the cases struggle with. That
struggle, in turn, illustrates inherent limitations on the judiciary’s ability to
resolve the trade-offs without aid of at least a formal framework such as the
framework this Article contributes; it also shows need for an administrative
mechanism to provide ex ante solutions, which this Article also contributes.
32

1. BOCA (1st Circuit 1980)

BOCA vacated an author’s preliminary injunction against a copier of a
state-adopted building code as improvidently granted. The author encouraged public authorities to adopt its code by reference, provided updates, and
sold the subject-state’s version for $22 per copy (the copier sold its version
for $35 per copy, though it contained only modest variations compared to
the official copyrighted code). The novel issue was whether inclusion of the
copyrighted code in state regulations rendered the materials freely available
for copying. The copier’s chief argument was that such adoption bore the
force of law, stripping the code of copyright. BOCA thus illustrates what I
call the semi-strong form route standards take into law.
The court stopped short of ruling definitely on the point. It framed the
issue by reference to the absence of copyright in judicial and legislative
33
works under Wheaton v. Peters and other cases, considering whether the
code’s private authorship made a legal difference compared to such cases.
Weighing public domain with incentives concerns, the court was “far from
persuaded” that the author retained copyright and was unable to conclude
that the rule as to judicial and legislative materials did not apply equally to
codes adopted as regulation. But it opted to “leave the door slightly ajar with
respect to [this] issue,” saying only that the author’s claim was insufficient
34
to sustain a preliminary injunction.
This reticence was due in part to the issue’s novelty and in part due to “a
possible trend towards state and federal adoption, either by means of incor35
poration by reference or otherwise, of model codes.” The issue remains
novel as a matter of law, but the “possible” trend rapidly accelerated.

31. For district court opinions, see Harrison Co. v. Code Revision Comm’n, 260 S.E.2d 30,
34 (Ga. 1979), and Georgia v. Harrison Co., 548 F. Supp. 110, 114–15 (N.D. Ga. 1982), vacated per
stipulation, 559 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
32. Bldg. Officials and Code Admin. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1980) [hereinafter BOCA].
33.

33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668 (1834).

34.

Id. at 736.

35. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1910, 308–309 (2005), adopting as federal regulation the National
Electrical Code, a copyrighted code similar to that at issue in BOCA).
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2. CCC (2d Circuit 1994)

CCC reversed a declaratory judgment for a copier against an author.
Both published information on used car valuations, the author in the socalled Red Book and the copier in a computer database. The court devoted
most of its opinion to questions of basic copyright eligibility, including as to
originality and the contours of copyright eligibility for compilations, turning
finally and briefly to the copier’s public domain defense to infringement.
This argument rested on establishment in state insurance law of Red Book
37
values as an alternative standard to set minimum loss payouts. State law’s
passing reference to the Red Book thus illustrates what I call the weak form
route standards take into law.
The court found no authority for the copier’s view, not even the otherwise sympathetic BOCA case, stating its unwillingness to decide “that a
state’s reference to a copyrighted work as a legal standard for valuation re38
sults in loss of the copyright.” While not dismissing the argument’s
credibility, offsetting considerations included its potential as a taking under
39
the Constitution and its sweeping reach. The court instanced the threat to
copyright in school textbooks when states require these in mandatory cur40
riculums. It noted doctrinal authority for a different balance: expanding fair
use defenses for personal copiers, but not immunizing commercial copiers
because this would destroy copyright’s goal of promoting creativity amid
41
“the increasing trend toward state and federal adoptions of model codes.”
Since CCC, this “increasing trend” has become a hardened reality.
42

3. Practice Management (9th Circuit 1997)

Practice Management affirmed a ruling that the American Medical Association (“AMA”) did not lose its copyright in a medical procedure coding
43
system when the system was required by government regulations. AMA
publishes and updates the coding system to classify medical procedures for
ease of reference. Congress instructed the Health Care Financing Administration (“HCFA”) to establish a uniform code to identify physicians’

36. CCC Info. Servs. Inc. v. MacLean Hunter Mkt. Rep., Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994)
[hereinafter CCC].
37. Id. at 73 n.29 (citing N.J. Admin. Code 11:3-10.4 (1988); 11 N.Y. Admin. Code
§ 216.7(c) (1990)).
38.

Id. at 74.

39.

The takings issue is real but likely underwhelming. See infra Section III.D.

40.

CCC, 44 F.3d at 74.

41.

Id. at 74, n.30 (quoting Nimmer, supra note 17, § 5.06[C] at 5–60).

42. Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997), amended
by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952 (1998).
43. The court found against the AMA on grounds that it misused this copyright in dealing
with the government. Id. at 521.
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services used in Medicare and Medicaid claim forms. Heralding trends in
the regulatory use of private standards, HCFA contracted with AMA to use
45
its coding system rather than reinvent the wheel. The contract required
46
HCFA to use this system and the regulation required users to do so.
The court referenced the law against copyrighting judicial opinions and
statutes, identifying the dual policy objectives associated with incentives
versus public domain (access, due process, notice). As to incentives, it stated
that: “invalidating [AMA’s] copyright on the ground that the [coding system] entered the public domain when HCFA required its use would expose
copyrights on a wide range of privately authored model codes, standards,
and reference works to invalidation”—including the Bluebook guide to legal
47
citations. As to public domain, the court found “no evidence that anyone
wishing to use the [coding system] has any difficulty obtaining access to it”
48
and “no realistic threat to public access.”
The court identified qualifying conventions to combat access restrictions
that private standard setters such as AMA might impose. These include:
(1) regulatory agencies could terminate agreements or adopt regulations
49
requiring standard setters to expand access; (2) courts could enlarge copyright infringement defenses such as fair use and due process; and
50
(3) legislators could adopt compulsory licensing arrangements. The Ninth
Circuit in Practice Management thus joined the Second Circuit in CCC to
sustain private copyrights when standards are embodied in law following
what I call the weak form route—with the First Circuit in BOCA deferring
judgment when private standards were embodied in law using what I call the
semi-strong form route.
51

4. Veeck (5th Circuit 2002)

The Fifth Circuit’s initial panel decision in Veeck joined the Second and
Ninth Circuits in these conclusions but, upon rehearing en banc, blazed a
different trail that closed the door left ajar by the First Circuit in BOCA. All
agreed on the facts: Southern Building Code Congress International, Inc.
(“SBCCI”) is a not-for-profit membership association that writes building
44.

42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(c)(5) (2000).

45.

Practice Mgmt., 121 F.3d at 518.

46. The court found the former to be misuse of copyright. Id. at 521. Practice Management
illustrates difficulties that can arise when classifying adoptions. The HCFA-AMA contract suggests
more than mere passing reference, signaling semi-strong form embodiment. But the court’s treatment of its terms as misuse of copyright vitiated copyright protection and thus the contract,
justifying classification as weak form embodiment.
47.

Id. at 519.

48.

Id.

49.
5672).
50.

Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 59, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. §§ 5659,
Id.

51. Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert.
denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003).
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codes; two small Texas towns enacted the 1994 edition of SBCCI’s Standard Building Code into law; and an individual published the enacted code
on a website (having paid for a copy but despite an accompanying licensing
agreement prohibiting such publication).
The Veeck majority emphasized Banks v. Manchester’s public domain
rationale, rejecting arguments that the opinion rested entirely on the ration52
ale that judges (and legislators) are paid to produce laws. When embodied
in law, the code lost copyright eligibility for another doctrinal reason: this
rendered the code a “fact” or “idea” incapable of expression in any way ex53
cept as embodied and copyright never protects facts or ideas. The majority
also distinguished CCC and Practice Management that upheld continuing
copyright in codes or standards when official legal materials make mere
54
passing references to them (what I call the weak form route).
As a matter of policy and incentives, the Veeck majority noted that, characteristic of such weak form adoption cases, authors produced work for
purposes other than enactment as law, whereas SBCCI’s purpose was to get
55
its codes enacted as law. The majority discounted arguments that decopyrighting privately produced standards when formally embodied in law
56
would so reduce producer revenues as to destroy incentives for production.
The majority emphasized that industry experts have inherent incentives to
produce industry codes, copyright or not, finding it difficult to imagine circumstances where greater inherent incentives exist (what I call the strong
57
form route illustrates what the court found difficult to imagine).
Judge Higginbotham’s brief dissent, which described Veeck as a “difficult case,” resisted deciding it under the refrain that “the law” belongs to the
people, emphasizing lack of institutional knowledge within federal appellate
courts concerning related incentive effects. It distinguished Banks as “about
the acquiring of copyrights by public officials, not . . . invalidating the copy58
rights held by private actors when their work is licensed by lawmakers.”
The challenge is to balance competing and abstract public policies, generally better suited for Congress than courts, but on the Veeck facts the balance
tipped toward SBCCI since: (a) the towns received a benefit and (b) holding
for the copier would invalidate copyright on all published codes ever
59
adopted by any governmental body.

52.

Id.

53. Id. at 800–01 (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)).
The Veeck majority wove together its analysis of how embodiment of the code in law rendered the
result a “fact” and/or an “idea.” See infra Section I.D.
54.

Veeck, 293 F.3d at 804–05.

55.

Id. at 805.

56.

Id. at 805 n.21.

57.

See id. at 806.

58.

Id. at 806–07 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).

59. Id. Judge Higginbotham’s conclusion that the majority’s ruling vitiates copyright in
codes embodied in law likely is correct. See infra text accompanying notes 253–254.
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Judge Wiener elaborated a blistering dissent, calling the majority’s opin60
ion “drastic” and “ill-suited for modern realities,” not a result that federal
courts are justified in reaching. First, Judge Wiener accepted the facts as
undisputed, but underscored: (a) the code’s embodiment in law was through
“incorporation by reference,” (b) the work was original, (c) the code was
readily available for purchase, and (d) the copier adopted the work whole61
sale without identifying its author. Second, Judge Wiener criticized the
majority opinion’s approach as providing no respectable analytical framework because it ignores: the nature of the author, the character of the work,
the relationship of the copier to the work and of the copier to the governmental enactor, and the nature of the copier (that is, whether the copier
needs to know the work/law’s contents).
62
Judge Wiener also emphasized that Veeck is “not a free access case”
and that no precedent exists, treating Banks as based on judicial compensation preventing judges from copyrighting their opinions (and similarly for
63
legislators) and noting the CCC court’s decision to continue copyright protection in private standards embodied in public law (through what I call the
64
weak form route). As a result, the case presented “a wide-open and unresolved question of copyright law” that should await resolution by Congress
65
or the Supreme Court because it is entirely a matter of public policy. The
majority filled the blankness of this policy slate chiefly by treating the code
as a “fact” or “idea” once embodied in law; Judge Wiener regarded this
treatment as simply a legal conclusion derived from policy determinations,
66
not an independent analytical tool.
Judge Wiener charged that the majority’s rhetoric of citizen ownership
67
of law is uncritical, naïve, “simplistic,” and “grandiloquent.” It fails to explore “distinctions between different types of enactments and the policy
68
considerations attendant on each.” Codes differ from judicial opinions or
statutes as to author, work, copier, and the governmental relation to each.
Thus, privately produced codes are: not funded from the “public fisc,” usually specialized requiring technical expertise, applicable to narrow classes of
60.

Veeck, 293 F.3d at 809–10 (Wiener, J., dissenting).

61.

Id. at 808–09.

62. Id. at 810. Judge Wiener acknowledged that, if standards embodied in law were not
freely accessible to the public, “any defendant prosecuted for violating [them] would surely prevail
on a due process defense.” Id. at 813 n.13.
63. Id. at 811, 813 n.15; see also County of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261
F.3d 179, 193 (2d Cir. 2001).
64. Id. at 811 (Wiener, J., dissenting) (citing CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt.
Rep., 44 F.3d 61, 73–74 (2d Cir. 1994)).
65.
at 68).

Id. at 812 & n.12 (citing Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888); CCC, 44 F.3d

66. Id. at 818–20. Judge Wiener responded fully to the majority’s conclusion that embodiment rendered the codes “ideas” but did not grapple with the conclusion that such embodiment
rendered the codes “facts.” See infra Section I.D.
67.

Veeck, 293 F.3d at 814 (Wiener, J., dissenting).

68.

Id.
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persons not the public at large, and favored as a matter of congressional pol69
icy. Judge Wiener noted that other federal courts recognize such
70
distinctions, instancing Practice Management and CCC.
The majority’s holding reduces production incentives, Judge Wiener believed, as SBCCI relies on revenues from code sales to fund operations ($3
71
million of its $9 million in revenues are from sales). Other federal courts
recognize this incentives component of the balancing exercise, again citing
72
Practice Management. When vitiating copyright causes revenue reduction,
73
incentives diminish “absent some alternative source of funds.” Providing
funding from sales (as opposed to member dues or contributions) keeps
74
standard setters independent from parochial influence. Governments benefit from works that such incentives create, given that otherwise they must
produce materials themselves, which may (a) be infeasible for lack of exper75
tise and (b) produce non-uniformity across jurisdictions. Judge Wiener also
noted other ways to maintain public access without impairing incentives,
76
including through doctrines of fair use, implied license, or waiver.
77

5. County of Suffolk (Variation)

Judge Wiener’s dissent in Veeck drew, in part, on County of Suffolk, a
case varying the theme of Veeck and its predecessors in that a governmental
entity created a copyrighted work rather than embody one created by another. As required by state law, the county created tax maps reflecting
ownership, size, and location of real property in the county’s subdivisions.
The court vacated an order dismissing the county’s complaint that a third
party infringed the county’s copyright.
The public domain issue, while novel, centered on the same question
Veeck and its predecessors turned on: whether tax maps are analogous to
statutes and judicial opinions. The court announced an approach familiar to
readers of the foregoing case summaries. Two factors influence whether a
work is in the public domain: (1) the author’s need for economic incentives
to create the work and (2) the public’s need for notice of the work to have
notice of law. Neither factor supported public domain in County of Suffolk,
because (1) even governmental authors may require incentives and (2) the

69.

Id.

70.

See id. at 815 n.23 (Wiener, J., dissenting).

71.

Id. at 816 n.24.

72.

Id. at 816 n.25.

73. Id. at 816–17. The alternative source of funds is a key point amplified in the case study
of accounting standards, infra text accompanying notes 171–174.
74.

Veeck, 293 F.3d at 817.

75.

Id.

76. Judge Wiener found that none of those existed in Veeck, without acknowledging any
tension. Id. at 824–25 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
77.

County of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 179, 194 (2d Cir. 2001).
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tax maps created no legal obligations and in any event access to them was
not restricted.
County of Suffolk thus appears to be an easy case. Its framework follows
CCC and Practice Management, also relatively easy cases in that they demonstrate the weak form route standards take into law (as the Veeck majority
acknowledged). BOCA and Veeck are more complex, exhibiting the semistrong form route that standards take into law. While Judge Wiener’s Veeck
dissent more completely investigates competing public policy trade-offs, the
Veeck majority’s conclusion is more likely on the right track, as was the
BOCA court’s judicious reluctance to resolve the issue upon a preliminary
injunction motion.
As an institutional matter, however, Judge Higginbotham’s brief dissent
in Veeck most resonates in expressing the federal judiciary’s inherent limitations in addressing such a sprawling public policy issue. Cases and
controversies federal courts resolve are not suitable forums to provide optimal solutions to the problems of private standards embodied in public law.
Such a framework must be provided by a more elaborate policy-oriented
process. Absent some process (prescribed in Part III), federal courts may be
aided by the analytical framework this Article contributes. Application will
be enriched by appreciating that copyright is not absolute but provides a
protective scope varying with context.
D. Protective Scope
The varying scope of copyright protection is conventionally imagined as
78
a continuum from thin to thick. Core doctrines pivot around this conception. As discussed below, these doctrines are principally (1) copyright
ineligibility for ideas and facts (dubbed the “idea-expression dichotomy”
79
and the related “merger doctrine”) and (2) “fair use,” overcoming copyright when certain factors concerning the nature of the work, copying, and
80
market justify permitting copying freely.
The idea-expression dichotomy holds that expressions of ideas are eligible for copyright but that ideas are not (analogous but independent analysis
applies to distinguish facts from their expression). The difference between
81
expressions and ideas is difficult to draw abstractly. The difficulty of sustaining the idea-expression distinction manifests in copyright’s merger
78. E.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Fleener v. Trinity
Broad. Network, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights
and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How It Threatens Creativity
115–16 (2001); Sonia K. Katyal, Ending the Revolution, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1465, 1485 (2002) (book
review).
79. E.g., Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 350; Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547–48 (1985).
80.
(1994).

E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569

81. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d
119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
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doctrine. It holds that the idea-expression distinction vanishes when there is
only one way (or are few ways) an idea can be expressed. Sustaining the
idea-expression distinction becomes so tenuous that the concepts merge and
82
become essentially the same thing. When the distinction between an idea
and its expression vanishes, copyright functionally treats the result as an
idea, not an expression, rendering it ineligible for copyright.
While the idea-expression distinction and merger doctrine provoke rea83
sonable classification disputes for particular examples, difficulties
essentially disappear once any otherwise contestable idea/expression is em84
bodied in law. Even if an idea can be expressed in numerous ways, when a
governmental entity prescribes that a particular expression of that idea is the
one to be followed under penalty of law, then there becomes only one way
to express that (legal) idea: the one found in the text embodied in law. Copyright law does not recognize any property interest in the idea. Put in a
kindred doctrinal box: facts are not eligible for copyright protection and
standards embodied in law are facts.
The fair use doctrine further restricts copyright’s protective scope based
85
upon numerous factors. A key factor is the nature of the work. Copying is
substantially restricted as to works of fiction compared to a relatively more
expansive fair use zone as to works of fact. Standards reside on the fact end
of this continuum. When embodied in law, standards move to the extreme
end of the continuum as facts (indeed, standards embodied in law may be
the ultimate facts in copyright terms).
A second factor is the purpose of copying. The least attractive copiers
are those who pass off another’s work as their own; also unattractive are
copiers selling another’s work at cut-rate prices, having avoided associated
preparation costs. Such activities with respect to standards promulgated by
others remain unattractive; many standards, however, are commonly used to
train persons responsible for related administration and to enable compli86
ance—creating a need for the most attractive copiers.
A third fair use factor concerns the effect of a copying upon the market for
a work. Public policy envisions an active marketplace for the expression of
ideas that will generate for society maximal idea production. In the market,
ideas battle for supremacy through competitive expression. This competition
is desirable across a wide spectrum, from the best way to account for mergers
82.

See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).

83. Reasonableness of disagreement justifies Judge Wiener’s statement in Veeck that the
idea-expression distinction and merger doctrine are end points of a legal analysis involving balancing competing policy goals, not independent analytical tools. Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l,
Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003), (Wiener, J., dissenting); see also Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject Matter, 35 Conn. L.
Rev. 439, 501 n.251 (2003).
84. This disappearance justifies the Veeck majority’s conclusion that, once embodied in law,
codes become “ideas” and/or “facts” ineligible for copyright. Veeck, 293 F.3d at 800–01; see also
Karjala, supra note 83.
85.

E.g., Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).

86.

Cf. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
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87

to the best cake recipe. How far this market vision should extend is uncertain.
Many standard setters compete solely for the prize of having their standards embodied in law. The market metaphor’s appropriate extent becomes
more certain in the case of governmental embodiment of a standard: the race
is over and that expression of an idea won. Competition shifts from racing
for best ideas and expressions to disseminating the idea most cheaply. Monopoly pricing that copyright affords would constitute a social defeat in this
leg of the competition.
Although Veeck and its predecessors did not fully develop or deploy
these doctrinal tools in this way, scholars and courts in other copyright disputes do so to determine the appropriate scope of copyright protection in
88
given cases. This account of copyright’s protective scope, and the doctrinal
summary preceding it, show both the uses of such techniques to resolve disputes and their limits. Copyright’s protective scope is thin for standards, but
it does exist.
While this presentation can thus sharpen understanding of the legal
89
landscape for future federal courts resolving disputes, it remains a bundle
of ex post solutions in circumstances crying out for ex ante guidance that the
90
judiciary appears institutionally incapable of providing. Moreover, doctrines of greatest utility, particularly compulsory licensing arrangements and
regulations mandating access, are outside a federal court’s competence to
91
establish.
Apart from institutional limitations on the federal judiciary’s policymaking ability, also missing from the contributions of the relevant cases and
doctrines defining copyright’s protective scope are theoretical perspectives
on the context of producing standards destined for embodiment in law.
These theoretical perspectives can be gleaned by considering the philosophical basis of U.S. copyright law.
E. Utilitarian Theory
A comprehensive theory of copyright law is not necessary to develop the
framework and analysis in this Article, but three key features of such a theory

87. See Malla Pollack, Note, Intellectual Property Protection for the Creative Chef, or How
to Copyright a Cake: A Modest Proposal, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1477 (1991).
88. See Veeck, 293 F.3d at 817. A fourth fair use factor addresses the portion of a copying
compared to a work as a whole. This factor presents questions of policy relating to rights to prevent
derivative works, discussed infra Section I.E.
89. These doctrinal analyses are also valuable in understanding that while government embodiment of privately promulgated standards in law may constitute a taking, the property interest
taken may be slight. See infra Section III.D.
90. A few cases resolved in a similar way applying a similar framework could do the trick.
Judging by the divided court in Veeck and differing analyses appearing in BOCA, CCC, and Practice
Management, it is risky to rely upon such an approach.
91. Copyright lawmaking is increasingly produced administratively and legislatively rather
than judicially. See Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 87 (2004).
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bear expressing. First, while some strands of a natural-rights basis for endowing a work’s creator with associated rights to control making and
92
distributing copies exist, the dominant rationale for copyright in the United
States is utilitarian. For example, the Constitution grants Congress power to
enact copyright laws to “promote the Progress of Science”—that is, learning
93
and knowledge. Creating incentives to produce, rather than rewarding production, is the overarching objective and philosophical basis of U.S.
94
copyright law.
Copyright law struggles to balance providing incentives to produce with
95
the more important objective of dissemination of ideas. Copyright’s ambi96
tion, then, is to achieve public, not private, benefits. While this conception
is not beyond dispute, its contours favoring the public interest are particularly poignant in the context of standards embodied in law. Along with the
location of standards embodied in law at the thin edge of copyright’s protective scope, this conception means that, in close cases, copyright law should
err on the side of concluding that such standards have become law, entered
the public domain, and lost copyright eligibility. It is on these grounds that
one may support the Veeck majority’s conclusions even while appreciating
the more complete analysis provided in Judge Wiener’s dissent.
Second, the foregoing doctrinal discussions illustrate a recurring theme
in copyright law: competing public policies must invariably be balanced. A
common component of such weighting exercises, likewise visible in the
foregoing discussions, concerns incentives copyright creates for production.
This incentive function has a long history in copyright theory and law. It is
debated because, in part, emerging evidence suggests that incentives supplied by copyright are less necessary than once thought to generate
97
production of copyright-eligible materials. While this debate may influence
copyright’s contours, incentive effects play a critical role in prevailing copyright law. They figure prominently as an analytical matter in the standardsembodied-in-law inquiry conducted in this Article.
For standard setters, however, incentives must be tailored to prevent
over-production. Unlike commercial producers for whom excessive incentives causing over-production can be dismissed by the marketplace by
92. E.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary
France and America, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 991 (1990); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual
Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287, 350–53 (1988); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as
Labor and Possession, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 517 (1990).
93. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Stephen Breyer, Economic Reasoning and Judicial
Review: AEI-Brookings Joint Center 2003 Distinguished Lecture Presented at the
American Enterprise Institute December 4, 2003, at 13 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. For Reg.
Studies ed., 2004).
94.

See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 644 (1834).

95.

See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).

96.

See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).

97. E.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 20, at 41–50; Adam D. Moore, Intellectual Property,
Innovation, and Social Progress: The Case Against Incentive Based Arguments, 26 Hamline L.
Rev. 601, 619 (2003).
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ignoring a product, over-production of standards requiring access and compliance can produce significant social costs. Quality is a more important
feature of standard setting than is quantity. In the case of accounting standards, for example, evidence indicates that there has been over-production
98
in quantity and under-production in quality. This consequence may not be
due to the standard setter’s assertion of copyright and consequent royalties
and licensing fees. But it does not support a case that copyright-and-sales
arrangements governing standards produce desirable much less optimal
qualitative attributes.
The third key feature of copyright theory especially relevant to standards
concerns incremental improvement in works. Copyright law vests rights to
99
create derivative works in authors of the original. In this protection, copyright’s utilitarianism cuts two ways. Copyright protection may provide
incentives in a present author to create a work, but protection also destroys
incentives for future authors to create derivative works that incrementally
improve prior work.
These competing cuts drive through copyright’s normative center, yielding contentious debates that invoke such powerful concepts as First
100
Amendment free speech rights to challenge protection of derivative works.
That William Shakespeare incrementally improved numerous previously
published plays—not possible when copyright protects against derivative
works—is a dramatic exhibit supporting free rights to create derivative
101
works.
For standards, the cut should probably be against copyright protection
giving standard setters absolute control over derivative works and in favor of
allowing third parties to provide incremental improvement through derivative
works. This cut favors copyright’s spirit of promoting the public good, of
maximal idea production through competition for expression supremacy. Determining an appropriate balance may vary with relative complexity of a
particular standard and the importance of keeping it up to date. Those not requiring much improvement warrant thicker derivative rights protection; those
susceptible to improvement warrant thinner protection and freer third-party

98. Accountants refer to over-production measured by standards quantity as standardsoverload. See, e.g., The FASB Addresses Standards Overload through New Projects, The Financial
Accounting Standards Board Report, Feb. 28, 2002, at 5; Bernhard Grossfeld, Global Accounting: Where Internet Meets Geography, 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 261, 294 (2000). Under-production
measured by standards quality is manifest in criticism that accounting standards are too dense and
rule-bound and insufficiently principles-based. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron, SarbanesOxley and Accounting Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 1023 (2003); Frederick Gill, Standards-Based Accounting Principles, 28 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 967 (2003);
Matthew A. Melone, United States Accounting Standards—Rules or Principles? The Devil Is Not in
the Details, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 1161 (2004).
99. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000); see Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright, Derivative
Works and Fixation: Is Galoob a Mirage, or Does the Form (Gen) of the Alleged Derivative Work
Matter?, 20 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 991, 1018–20 (2004).
100. E.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech
and How Copying Serves It, 114 Yale L.J. 535, 551–56 (2004).
101.

Pun recognized. See Landes & Posner, supra note 20, at 66–70.
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ability to make improvements this way. These issues pervade copyright law,
and apply to all standards, whether or not embodied in law.
For standards embodied in law, if incremental improvement by derivative works were the sole factor, one might conclude that embodiment entails
relinquishment of this component of copyright protection. All standards embodied in law would be subject to improvement through free rights to
derivative creation. Yet just as other factors influence the degree to which
standards embodied in law should be subject to free copying, they prevent
such an easy solution to determining the extent of derivative rights. This
Article’s three-part framework again helps to focus normative attention.
Strong form adoption signals high juridical stakes in standards quality, implying greater need for freer third-party rights to create derivative works;
weak form signals the opposite end of the spectrum; and semi-strong form
circumstances reside in between.
II. Case Study
The history of accounting standard setting in the United States shows
numerous different bodies participating in an endless process of establishing
and evolving generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) and generally accepted auditing standards (“GAAS”). Unlike in most countries,
where accounting standards are produced by legislative bodies, in the
102
United States private organizations produce them. Nevertheless, they bind
citizens, just as laws do, meaning they must be accessible to such persons
and professional advisors. Successive generations of standard setters must
likewise have access to—and may need ability to build upon—
promulgations of predecessors.
Until 2002, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(“AICPA”) and its predecessors, not-for-profit professional associations of
accountants, promulgated GAAS. AICPA substantially codified its standards
103
in 2002. These are comprised of about 100 Statements on Auditing Standards prescribing methods of performing financial statement audits, as well
as pronouncements governing quality controls, ethics, independence and
104
105
other matters. AICPA asserts copyright over all these materials.
102. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Semiotics, Hermeneutics, and Cash: An Essay on the
True and Fair View, 28 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 893 (2003). Globalization pressures countries
away from the traditional legislative approach of enacting accounting standards towards using unelected private bodies. See id. at 921–22.
103. Codification of Accounting Standards and Procedures, Statement of Auditing
Standards No. 95, § 150 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2002).
104. E.g., Codification of Accounting Standards and Procedures, Code of Professional Conduct §§ 101, 102, 191 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2002); Codification of
Accounting Standards and Procedures, Statements on Quality Control Standards §§ 20–40
(Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2002).
105. A few additional independence principles forming part of GAAS were produced by the
short-lived Independence Standards Board. Independence Standards Nos. 1–3 (Independence
Standards Bd. 1998–2000). The SEC also directly establishes certain GAAS components, principally concerning independence. See Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (2004).
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In 2002, Congress ousted AICPA from this role, creating instead a Pub106
lic Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”). PCAOB is
nominally a private not-for-profit corporation, though it has characteristics
of an instrumentality of the federal government relevant to questions of due
107
process. It is funded by fees Congress levies on public companies and
108
their auditors. PCAOB began its mission by adopting a substantial body of
109
GAAS promulgated by AICPA. PCAOB did not assert copyright over
these materials and has produced few of its own worth copyrighting, but
asserts copyright over the contents of its website and its annual reports.
Until 1973, promulgation of GAAP was dominated by bodies designated
110
by AICPA. Many of these works remain integral to GAAP, as do various
supplemental publications AICPA has produced since 1973 that build on
earlier materials by interpretation or elaboration. AICPA always has asserted
copyright over these works, which span thousands of pages of text almost
certainly meeting basic requirements for copyright eligibility.
Since 1973, production of GAAP has been dominated by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”). The SEC formally recognizes
111
FASB as an authoritative standard setter. FASB’s primary promulgations
are Statements of Financial Accounting Standards, plus numerous supplemental materials aggregating some ten-thousand pages of copyright112
qualifying text, over all of which FASB asserts copyright.
So who owns copyrights to accounting standards, PCAOB, AICPA,
FASB, or no one? This Part’s case study of accounting standards animates a
framework designed to facilitate analysis of such questions. The framework
delineates two examples at the extremes: PCAOB illustrates the strong form
route standards take into law (its standards are never eligible for copyright
in this framework) and AICPA illustrates the weak form route standards take
into law (its standards may retain copyright, subject to qualifying conventions

106. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101, 116 Stat. 750 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 7211). AICPA continues to establish auditing standards for audits of non-SEC entities.
107.

See infra text accompanying notes 113–118.

108.

Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 109.

109. Professional Standards, Interim Auditing Standards, Rule 3200T (Pub. Co. Acct.
Oversight Bd. 2003).
110. These were: the Committee on Accounting Procedure (1938–59 which published Accounting Research Bulletins, including a codification of extant standards in 1953), see
Restatement and Revision of Accounting Research Bulletins, Accounting Research Bulletin No.43 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants: Comm. On Accounting Procedure 1953), and
the Accounting Principles Board (1962–73), which published Opinions, see, e.g., Interpretative
Opinions Nos. 1–31 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants: Accounting Principles Bd. 1962–73).
111. See Commission Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, Securities Act Release No. 8221, Exchange Act Release No.
47743, 80 SEC Docket 139 (Apr. 25, 2003) [hereinafter SEC Policy Statement Reaffirming FASB
Status]; Accounting Series Release No. 150, 3 SEC Docket 275 (1973) [hereinafter SEC, ASR No.
150].
112. FASB produces voluminous secondary and tertiary guidance addressing subjects that are
more complex, novel, or specialized than those that primary materials address, making access to
them less pressing in general but more critical for those affected by particular issues.
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protecting access while preserving incentives). FASB illustrates the semistrong route standards take into law. This poses the greatest difficulties, but
these are eased by evaluation of the other examples. Application suggests
that most, but not all, FASB promulgations are ineligible for copyright.
A. Strong Form: PCAOB
The easiest illustration of the strong form route that standards take into
law is when a governmental agency develops standards and adopts them as
113
regulation—a widespread practice in federal government. Nearly as easy
to classify are standards that PCAOB produces. Despite congressional protestations, PCAOB appears to be part of the U.S. government; even if it were
not, its congressional mandate and funding system negate rationales for
copyright in its standards.
1. Government Works
When Congress created PCAOB in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(“SOX”), it announced that PCAOB “shall not be an agency or establish114
ment of the United States [g]overnment.” Congressional characterizations
of instrumentalities it creates are not definitive, at least as to constitutional
115
matters. Notwithstanding this characterization, PCAOB’s characteristics
more likely make it a branch of the U.S. government, at least for due proc116
ess purposes. It is authorized to make and enforce law, is overseen by the
SEC in every particular from board identity to approval of standards, and
117
properly follows processes characteristic of federal lawmaking bodies. If
these characteristics render PCAOB a part of the U.S. government, then its

113.
items).

See infra Section III.A (noting federal government repository boasting some 3 million

114. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101(b), 116 Stat. 750 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 7211). SOX also states that “No member or person employed by, or agent for, [PCAOB]
shall be deemed to be an officer or employee of or agent for the Federal Government by reason of
such service.” Id.
115. See, e.g., Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995). While Congress
might properly declare Amtrak not a government agency for purposes of such congressionally controlled matters as jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act or sovereign immunity, “it is
not for Congress to make the final determination of Amtrak’s status as a [g]overnment entity for
purposes of determining the constitutional rights of citizens affected by its actions.” Id. at 375.
116. See Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its
Public/Private Status, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 975 (2005).
117. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j–1 (2002); Sarbanes-Oxley Act
§ 105(c)(4); Investigations and Adjudications, Rules 5100–13, 5200–06, 5300–04, 5400–69
(Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd. 2004). PCAOB promulgations require SEC approval and the SEC
generally is required to publish any proposed PCAOB rule for public comment before it decides to
approve the rule or to institute disapproval proceedings. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 107(b)(4).
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works are ineligible for copyright under the government works doctrine of
118
the Copyright Act and as a matter of due process.
2. Independent Contractor
PCAOB’s exact juridical status may be uncertain. PCAOB’s putative
lawmaking function is a compelling reason to consider it part of the U.S.
government. If it were not part of that government, then its purported lawmaking and enforcement roles risk running afoul of limitations on lawmaker
119
delegation of lawmaking functions to private actors. This limitation would
be checked, in part, by rules that require the SEC to approve all PCAOB
120
promulgations before they become effective.
But suppose PCAOB is neither part of the U.S. government nor an agent
thereof. It may be viewed as an independent contractor, preparing works for
the U.S. government that the government could prepare itself. While it is
possible for independent contractors of the federal government who produce
works to hold related copyright, this conclusion is not automatic.
Congressional policy guides agencies in using independent contractors
to perform such work, balancing not only the need for access with the need
for incentives, but also inquiring into whether the agency could produce the
121
work itself. There is no question that the SEC could promulgate auditing
standards itself. In fact, it does so routinely in a body of auditing regulations
that supplement or complement GAAS promulgated by PCAOB or AICPA.
122
Examples include the SEC’s independence requirements for auditors.
Consider an illustration of SEC promulgation of auditing standards despite private-sector efforts to do so. In the late 1990s, the Independence
Standards Board (“ISB”), a private body led by AICPA-member firms and
private professionals, pursued promulgating auditor independence stan123
dards. The SEC participated as an observer in its process for three years,
before deciding it did not like ISB’s proposals. So it effectively shut ISB
118. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2000); supra Section I.A; see also Veeck v. S. Bldg.
Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003)
(Wiener, J., dissenting).
119. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935); see infra Part III.
120.

Supra note 117.

121. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (factors bearing upon
status of independent contractor under work-for-hire doctrine); United States v. Wash. Mint, L.L.C.,
115 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (D. Minn. 2000) (independent contractor coin within exception because federal mint workers lacked skill necessary to achieve public approval); see also Schnapper v. Foley,
471 F. Supp. 426 (D.D.C. 1979) (independent contractor films within government works doctrine
exception because using private filmmaker was not “an alternative to having one of [the agency’s]
own employees prepare the work”). Reid’s independent contractor test may be read to give federal
agencies latitude in characterizing the status of persons they hire to generate standards and the copyright consequences. While judicial deference to such conclusions may be warranted, additional
regulatory oversight may be desirable to assure optimal classification. See supra notes 21–22 and
accompanying text; see also infra Part III.
122.

See Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (2004).

123.

I served as director of one of ISB’s task forces during 1999–2001.
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down and established rules it preferred, addressing precisely the contexts on
124
which ISB had worked. To the extent that copyright in government works
produced by independent contractors hinges on whether the government
could produce the work itself, as a normative matter, PCAOB’s standards
should not be protected.
3. Incentives
As a matter of congressionally announced policy, incentives are another
factor in assessing whether an independent contractor should be entitled to
hold copyright in works it produces under contract with the federal govern125
ment. Congress created PCAOB and directed it to promulgate GAAS for
public companies. That mandate moots incentive inquiries for PCAOB that
126
copyright could provide. While simply paying an independent contactor to
perform work would not necessarily deprive it of copyright, in PCAOB’s
case its function is far broader and ongoing: it is establishing law, investigating compliance with it, and enforcing those laws against citizens.
The ongoing funding of these operations likewise renders nugatory
questions of copyright-driven incentives for others. PCAOB has a congressional grant of monopoly power over this production function. No other
body is recognized to produce GAAS for SEC registrants, nor is there any
mechanism in SOX for creating or recognizing any such alternative body.
Given monopoly power in the production function, it is unnecessary to recognize the monopoly power of copyright in resulting work. This result also
justifies authorizing others than PCAOB freely to create derivative works
based on its standards as and after it generates them. Allowing such use
would improve standard-making capabilities of standard setters currently
promulgating auditing principles for non-SEC contexts (including AICPA)
and will improve such capabilities of any successors to PCAOB Congress or
the SEC may create in the future.
Moreover, as with any standard setter, incentives measured by royalties
and licensing fees likely drive an organization towards greater emphasis on
quantity of production rather than quality of production. Thus it would be a
mistake to believe that copyright incentives for PCAOB serve copyright’s
goals or the securities regulation goals underlying SOX’s creation of
PCAOB. Securities regulation goals include promoting reliable financial
124. The SEC adopted auditor independence rules in 2001 and Congress enacted them into
law, substantially verbatim, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Compare Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201(a), 116. Stat. 771 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78j–l), with 17 C.F.R.
§ 210.2-01(c)(4)(i)–(ix) (2004) (the statute and the regulations restrict auditors from providing exactly the same non-audit services, using nearly identical language).
125.

See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.

126. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991); see also County
of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 179, 194 (2d Cir. 2001). If exceeding minimum statutory mandate requires incentives, additional analysis may be necessary. It would
recognize that copyright protection’s availability does not depend on the quality of expression
(compared to patentability, for example, which does depend on quality of invention). See Karjala,
supra note 83.
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reporting through superior audits in order to protect investors and the public
interest. These goals likely are advanced by permitting free access to
PCAOB standards, including rights to create derivative works based upon
them.
Finally, PCAOB’s funding arrangements negate the relevance of royalties or licensing fees and their incentive effects. PCAOB began operating in
2003. For that year, operating revenues were provided virtually entirely by
127
128
fees Congress levied on public companies. These totaled $52.8 million.
The remaining portion, $2 million, was provided by audit firm registration
129
130
fees, which are allocated specifically to recovering related costs. Total
expenses amounted to $29.4 million. The excess of revenue over expense,
along with $400,000 in interest income, yielded an unrestricted net asset
131
balance of $25.8 million. PCAOB simply does not need royalties or licensing fees from copyright on its work, as a matter of incentives or of
budgeting generally.
In its first years of operation, PCAOB produced few of its own standards
worth publishing or selling—under copyright or otherwise. Its adoption of
GAAS promulgated by AICPA in prior decades raises the question whether
PCAOB has the right to copy and distribute this material. As critically, does
PCAOB have the right freely to use these standards to improve them? That
is, does AICPA have copyright over these? The foregoing provides grounds
for concluding that AICPA—and everyone else—should be free to use and
modify PCAOB standards. The reciprocal inquiry concerns what rights
132
PCAOB—and everyone else—has as to AICPA standards.
B. Weak Form: AICPA
The easiest illustration of the weak form route that standards take into
law in the accounting context occurs when a judge or regulator references
textbooks, handbooks or other materials recognized as constituting a gener133
ally accepted accounting principle. Such references do not destroy
127.

Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 2003 Annual Report 19 (2003).

128.

Id.

129.

Id.

130.

Id. at 15.

131.

Id. at 19.

132. PCAOB’s website discloses the following in explaining its adoption of AICPA materials
as its own standards: “The AICPA asserts a copyright in the AICPA Codification and standards. This
material is being displayed on the PCAOB’s Web site pursuant to a license and is displayed with an
AICPA copyright notice.” Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., Interim Standards: Copyright Notice, http://www.pcaobus.org/standards/interim_standards/copyright.asp (last visited June 7, 2005).
PCAOB’s rights thus depend on the scope of this license. PCAOB does not otherwise have any
copyright in AICPA standards because PCAOB did not create them.
133. This is possible under AICPA’s Statement on Auditing Standards No. 69, which defines a
hierarchy of sources that constitute generally accepted accounting standards; when the listed guidance does not address a matter, authority may be found in textbooks, handbooks, and articles.
Codification of Accounting Standards and Procedures, Statement on Auditing Standards
No. 69, § 411.05 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2001).
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copyright. However, to the extent such materials represent embodiment in
law implicating due process matters, such materials could not be restricted
from public access. Traditional jurisprudence in the law of evidence and
134
Constitutional law implicitly recognizes such concerns.
When such materials provide a more comprehensive basis for evaluating
legal obligations, access concerns become proportionately more prominent,
even when the materials are embodied in law by mere citation. This more
interesting—and important—context is illustrated by AICPA’s role in establishing accounting standards. AICPA is a private not-for-profit association
whose leadership is not appointed by nor overseen by any governmental
authority. Its work is conducted for the trade association at large, for the
profession of CPAs, and its promulgations of GAAS and GAAP address a
wide range of circumstances beyond the SEC’s purview. References to its
standards have been far broader than passing references such as to textbooks, but their embodiment in law has nevertheless been attenuated.
1. Legal References
As for AICPA’s work on GAAS, Congress authorized PCAOB to adopt
as initial or transitional standards “any portion of any statement of auditing
standards or other professional standards that [PCAOB] determines satisfy
the requirements of [the Act] and that were proposed by 1 or more profes135
sional groups of accountants.” It also directed that any such standards be
separately approved by the SEC. Pursuant to this law, PCAOB announced
that auditors of public companies must comply with GAAS as articulated by
136
137
AICPA. The SEC approved these standards. They thus became embodied in law through the weak form route.
As for AICPA’s works contributing to GAAP, they became embodied in
law by weak form adoption as well, though in slightly different manner. In
1938, the SEC formally adopted a policy of recognizing accounting princi138
ples as acceptable for which “substantial authoritative support existed.”
AICPA bodies were the primary providers of such support through 1973,
and continued to provide supplemental authority after that year. The SEC
reiterated its recognition in 1973 when it also recognized FASB, stating that
extant AICPA standards would continue to be so recognized unless super139
seded. While the SEC has never similarly recognized AICPA’s post-1973
134. For example, references to obscure medical texts would simply not be probative of a
physician’s standard of care in a negligence case.
135. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 103(a)(3)(B), 116 Stat. 756 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7214).
136. Professional Standards, Rules 3200T, 3300T, 3400T, 3500T, 3600T (Pub. Co. Acct.
Oversight Bd. 2003).
137. Order Regarding Section 103(a)(3)(B) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Securities Act
Release No. 8222, Exchange Act Release No. 47745, 80 SEC Docket 142 (Apr. 25, 2003) [hereinafter SEC Order Approving PCAOB Initial Standards].
138.

Accounting Series Release No. 4, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,005 (Apr. 25, 1938).

139.

SEC, ASR No. 150, supra note 111, at 276 n.1.
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supplemental contributions, it relies on them in enforcement actions
141
has more indirectly recognized them.

and

2. Incentives
Despite weak form embodiment in law of AICPA promulgations that
bind public companies and their employees and advisors, the issue of incen142
tives remains for AICPA as well as others similarly situated. In general,
AICPA has incentives to work for its trade association members. Since its
members are subject to promulgations of FASB and PCAOB (and the SEC),
AICPA has incentives to assist these organizations in standard setting. It
does this through comment letters and other drafting exercises that it knows
are not destined to constitute authoritative standards. These contributions
make it difficult to imagine AICPA’s leadership withdrawing from the field
of accounting standard setting after having led it for nearly a century,
whether or not its work is protected by copyright.
On the other hand, after SOX the SEC ordained FASB as the national
accounting standard setter, possibly erasing incentives for AICPA or any
other body to contribute to standards-development by independent promulgations. This destruction of incentives, however, is not a matter of copyright
law, making the question of incentives as a matter of copyright law moot.
Some residual incentives to promulgate formal stances on accounting matters may remain to the extent that FASB’s SEC-designation is neither
143
irrevocable nor necessarily exclusive. This incentive exists as a matter of
competition for regulatory recognition, however, not so much as a conse144
quence of the copyright regime.
Furthermore, neither SOX’s creation of PCAOB nor the SEC’s recognition of FASB alters the role AICPA plays in creating accounting standards
for entities outside the jurisdiction of the federal securities laws. These include private enterprises, not-for-profit organizations, individuals, and
140. See, e.g., Avon Prods., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-46215, 78 SEC Docket 70
(July 17, 2002); America Online, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-42781, 72 SEC Docket 1009
(May 15, 2000).
141. First, PCAOB adopted AICPA-GAAS, including Statement of Auditing Standard No. 69,
which defined the “GAAP hierarchy” that includes post-1973 AICPA promulgations. Second, in
2003 the SEC endorsed PCAOB’s adoption of these auditing standards establishing the GAAP hierarchy. SEC Order Approving PCAOB Initial Standards, supra note 137.
142. Many persons may have incentives to participate in establishing accounting standards;
existing literature establishes a “GAAP hierarchy,” defining a priority among GAAP sources that
begins with pronouncements of FASB and AICPA and concludes with a catch-all that includes articles, handbooks, textbooks and similar resources. See supra notes 133, 141. Some believe too many
accounting standard setters exist. See Grossfeld, supra note 98.
143.

This is the SEC’s position. See infra Section II.C.3 (FASB’s current statutory role).

144. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 805 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc),
cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003) (plaintiff and other code writers have “survived and grown over
60 years, yet no court has previously awarded copyright protection for the copying of an enacted
building code under circumstances like these”); see also Karjala, supra note 83 (noting that the 1980
BOCA opinion expressed reservations and it was only in the 1994 CCC case that such judicial protection was first expressed).
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governmental entities. While these organizations and their advisors may be
bound, as a functional matter of law, by applicable AICPA pronouncements,
they are so bound as a result of weak form reference to these pronouncements in various legal materials, ranging from one-off judicial opinions to
145
statutory or regulatory reference.
Withdrawing copyright from AICPA works could, in theory, reduce
AICPA’s production incentives, at least as a matter of quantity. As noted,
however, some evidence suggests that AICPA over-produced quantities of
146
materials, paying inadequate attention to quality. On the other hand, a review of AICPA’s financial performance and the role of sales in its budget
suggest that copyright revenue is not a main reason or motivation for its
production of materials.
147
As a percentage of total revenue, AICPA’s sales hover around 18%. Of
AICPA’s $165 million in 2003 revenue, for example, $31 million is from
148
sales (in 2002, these figures were $162 million and $33 million). AICPA’s
sales arms sustained significant losses and as of mid-2003 suffered a common stockholders’ deficit of $85 million, funded primarily by preferred
149
stockholders. While AICPA boasted positive net unrestricted assets from
1999 through 2001, it accumulated a deficit during 2002 and 2003, and ran a
150
net revenue-expense deficit in each of those years.
These difficulties besetting AICPA likely reflect that AICPA’s primary
mission is to serve as a trade association for accountants. Trade associations
are not in the business of making money. Not only are they not likely to be
good at this, profit-seeking is likely to disaffect association members not
sharing in profits as owners. AICPA’s financial performance mirrors that of
traditional guilds, not profit-seeking enterprises. Selling products is thus not
exactly a good business for AICPA, providing no evidence that these revenue streams are a source of AICPA production incentives. It is thus difficult
to conclude that copyright protection is an important motivator in inducing
AICPA to contribute to standard-setting processes.
Finally, protecting AICPA copyright in its historical works would impair
PCAOB’s ability freely to use and distribute this work, including those it
145. E.g., Government Auditing Standards ¶ 1.09 (U.S. Comptroller Gen. 2003). In some
circumstances, courts have expressly rejected GAAP as a binding legal standard. See, e.g., Klang v.
Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs., 702 A.2d 150, 155 (Del. 1997).
146. See supra text accompanying note 98; see also SEC, Study Pursuant to Section
108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the United States Financial Reporting System of a Principles-Based Accounting System (2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand.htm (last modified July 25, 2003) [hereinafter
SEC, Study on Adopting Principle-Based Accounting System].
147. Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 2002–2003 Annual Report, available at
http://www.aicpa.org/about/annrpt/homepage.htm.
148. Id. at 19. Sales derive from copyrighted accounting publications of the Accounting Principles Board (“APB”) and the Committee on Accounting Procedures (“CAP”), as well its other
promulgations that constitute supplemental sources of GAAP, and all AICPA’s GAAS promulgations.
149.

Id. at 30 n.12.

150.

Id.
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formally adopted as its own. This impairment could reduce the quality of
standards PCAOB and other successor bodies produce. While this privilege
can be important to successor bodies, it risks further impairing incentives in
present bodies. That is, if AICPA knows successors (including PCAOB) can
simply copy its promulgations, as well as use them as first drafts of new
standards, AICPA incentives to produce may incrementally decline.
On balance, to the extent AICPA accounting materials are embodied in
law and bear on the legal obligations of managers, accountants and auditors,
the requirement of public domain may outweigh any residual incentive requirements for the AICPA. The standards are thus entitled to thin copyright
protection, at best. This likely remains the case when rights to create derivative works are included in the calculus. The balancing inquiry is certainly far
closer in the case of AICPA than with PCAOB (or FASB, as discussed below).
3. Qualifying Conventions
While resolving close cases in favor of derecognizing copyright is defensible given copyright’s thin protection of standards and utilitarian
underpinnings, other qualifying doctrines can be sought. These are intermediate measures between completely retaining and completely derecognizing
copyright. Such measures can be tailored to circumstances in which standards embodied in law create public access needs yet are produced by
private bodies requiring production incentives that copyright provides. They
can also be adapted to provide authorization for third parties to create derivative works in appropriate cases, as where standards are complex and
dynamic.
The most general copyright limitation applicable to standards embodied
in law is due process. To the extent legal materials define rights and duties
of citizens, they must be freely accessible or else run afoul of due process
considerations. It is possible to treat this due process constraint as a qualifying doctrine in that persons denied access have a defense to charges of
151
violating a standard or that copyright infringement would be excused. But
this characterization is unsatisfactory because it does not promote access
and it arises in an ex post context. Needed are mechanisms, ex ante, to promote free access, avoid resort to litigation in which such defenses are
asserted and, in appropriate circumstances, authorize production of deriva152
tive works.
151. This characterization appears in both Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121
F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997), amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952
(1998), and Judge Wiener’s Veeck dissent, in Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791,
810 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003).
152. Such qualifying doctrines are mentioned in the cases discussed in Section I.C. See supra
notes 49–50 and accompanying text; supra note 39 and accompanying text. Judge Wiener’s dissenting opinion in Veeck also mentioned implied license and waiver. 293 F.3d at 810. But such exercises
of voluntary authorization or relinquishment of a known right are not adaptable for inclusion in an
ex ante prescriptive framework. The doctrines may bear on any takings analysis arising from governmental embodiment of private standards in public law. See infra Section III.D.
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Existing fair use doctrine may encompass many circumstances in which
the copyright consequences of embodying standards in law are at issue. As
Section I.D. demonstrated in discussing the scope of copyright protection,
standards likely drive the broadest possible scope of fair use. As with due
process, however, fair use is a defense to copyright infringement allegations,
an ex post posture that a prudent framework for evaluating copyright stan153
dards embodied into law would rely upon only as a back-up. Courts
should use such doctrines to resolve disputes, but a coherent policy requires
an administrative mechanism to provide solutions ex ante.
More promising ex ante solutions are compulsory licensing arrange154
The Copyright Act provides numerous examples of these
ments.
arrangements in which copyright is recognized but owners are obliged to
155
grant licenses to use works at designated fee levels. Properly designed,
156
these can optimize competing policy objectives. While critics note that
they also reduce incentives for actors to search for privately negotiated
157
terms of access, these criticisms are inapposite to the context of standards
embodied in law implicating due process concerns.
Others may object to using compulsory licensing for standards because
they believe that standards deserve no copyright protection at all. These opposing views reflect the fact that compulsory licensing schemes are
controversial. But they also suggest, rightly, that such an approach can be an
ideal way to balance policy trade-offs in many weak form embodiment
158
cases and would be particularly suitable in the case of AICPA. It guaran159
tees access while providing any needed funding. They can also be used to

153. Copyright’s idea-expression distinction and merger doctrine suggest a narrow scope of
copyright protection for standards, before and after embodiment, but these tools are applied ex post.
See supra Section I.D.
154.

See Practice Mgmt., 121 F.3d at 519.

155. E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2000) (cable television); 17 U.S.C. §§ 114–15 (2000) (sound
recordings); 17 U.S.C. § 118 (2000) (public broadcasting); 17 U.S.C. § 119 (2000) (satellite); see
also 17 U.S.C. § 116 (repealed 1993) (jukeboxes).
156. See generally Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and
Compulsory Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. Rev. 1107, 1127–39 (1977).
157. Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 Colum. L.
Rev. 2655 (1994); see also Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1293 (1993).
158. See Barbara A. Ringer, Copyright in the 1980’s, 23 Bull. Copyright Soc’y 299 (1976).
In fashioning compulsory licensing arrangements, U.S. lawmakers must assure compliance with
applicable international treaties, including the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPs) treaty. See David Nimmer, GATT’s Entertainment: Before and NAFTA, 15 Loy. L.A. Ent.
L.J. 133, 147–50 (1995). Establishing compulsory licensing arrangements for standards embodied in
law should easily satisfy TRIPs, which limits copyright restrictions according to reasonableness
standards.
159. Another alternative is an open-access concept. Standard setters fix the work in an electronic format and retain copyright, but permit users in perpetuity free access and limited copying
rights. See Samuel E. Trosow, Copyright Protection for Federally Funded Research: Necessary
Incentive or Double Subsidy?, 22 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 613, 671–72 (2004). This guarantees
access but provides no funding.
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distinguish various rights that copyright law provides, ranging from rights to
copy to rights to prepare derivative works.
Another useful qualifying convention may be administered by the governmental entity embodying standards in law. The entity could simply
require a standard setter to provide greater access to recognized standards or
to withdraw recognition of those standards. It could also address questions
of derivative rights. A partial version of this approach is implicitly used by
many federal governmental agencies when embodying standards into law
160
through incorporation by reference. This resembles the stance that the
SEC now favors for FASB’s promulgation of accounting standards, discussed next.
C. Semi-Strong Form: FASB
Federal securities laws vest the SEC with authority to define generally
161
accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”). The SEC traditionally discharges this responsibility by looking to accounting standards generated by
professional organizations. In 1973, the SEC formally recognized FASB
162
pronouncements as establishing authoritative GAAP. In 2002, SOX imposed boundaries on this traditional SEC policy, including requiring any
recognized standard setter to be funded entirely by fees that Congress levies
163
on public companies.
Pursuant to SOX, FASB applied to the SEC for recognition and the SEC
164
approved this request. In doing so, the SEC noted that such recognition is
permitted under SOX’s boundaries only when a standard setter is able to
assist the SEC in meeting requirements of the federal securities laws, includ165
ing helping to improve the reliability of financial reporting. The SEC opined
166
that FASB’s overseer, the Financial Accounting Foundation (“FAF”), met
160. Part III, infra, builds upon this insight to propose requiring the Director of the Federal
Register to include an overall assessment of copyright consequences when approving federal embodiment of standards in law.
161.

See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77s(a), 77aa(25) & (26) (2000).

162. SEC, ASR No. 150, supra note 111. Formal approval of FASB promulgations by the
SEC is not required. In fact, FASB promulgations also address entities outside the SEC’s jurisdiction. E.g., Financial Statements of Not-for-Profit Organizations, Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 117 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1993). However, the SEC exerts
significant influence over FASB and as a practical matter no accounting standard applicable to public companies is adopted without the SEC’s functional approval. Congress also exercises direct
oversight of FASB through various standing committees, and occasionally threatens to terminate its
status or uses other means to influence the standards it promulgates. E.g., Equity Expansion Act of
1993, H.R. 2759, 103d Cong. (1st Sess. 1993); Donald E. Kieso, et al., Intermediate Accounting 871, 997–98 (10th ed. 2001); Arthur Levitt, Take on the Street, 109–13, 241
(2002).
163.

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 108 (2002).

164.

SEC Policy Statement Reaffirming FASB Status, supra note 111.

165.

Id.

166. The Financial Accounting Foundation is a Delaware corporation organized in 1972 to
operate exclusively as a Section 501(c)(3) entity under the Internal Revenue Code. In addition to
overseeing FASB, it oversees Governmental Accounting Standards Board (“GASB”), promulgator
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167

this and other SOX requirements. With this congressionally mandated SEC
recognition, FASB now receives 100% of its funding from congressionally
levied fees on public companies.
1. Public Domain
As a result of the SEC’s formal anointment of FASB in 1973, and its
congressionally inspired reaffirmation in 2003, FASB’s pronouncements are
embodied in law. Preliminary doubt thus arises as to whether these pronouncements remain eligible for copyright. This is particularly so given that
this otherwise private body is now funded entirely by congressionally levied
fees. Based on these considerations, the SEC has drawn the policy conclusion that FASB should make its standards freely available. In a SOXmandated study of the quality of U.S. accounting standards, the SEC explained:
[There is no] single, searchable database containing all of the authoritative
guidance. . . . [S]uch a database should be more readily available to accounting professionals. . . . [and] to financial statement users seeking to
better understand the meaning of financial statements. . . . FASB should
have the responsibility for developing and maintaining the resource. . . .
[T]he key question is whether this resource should be freely available to
the public or should be made available on a subscription or cost-per-access
basis. [Given SOX’s funding of FASB,] we believe that the long-run goal
168
should be for the FASB’s documents to be freely available.

This SEC policy statement speaks firmly in declaring the importance of
access and its reference to FASB’s funding under SOX shows the irrele169
vance of FASB incentives. On the other hand, the statement does not
address rights to create derivative works that could promote incremental improvement of standards quality. A coherent policy should address this question
170
as well. Moreover, additional attention to incentives and to related policy
of accounting principles for governmental entities. This relationship and its problems are discussed
below in this section.
167. SEC Policy Statement Reaffirming FASB Status, supra note 111. The SEC concluded
that “the standards set by the FASB are recognized as ‘generally accepted’ under section 108 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.” Id.
168. SEC, Study on Adopting Principles-Based Accounting System, supra note 146,
pt. IV.E (emphasis added).
169. FAF’s 2004 Financial Statements claim: “In 2003, FASB made its Statements available
for downloading without charge from the Board’s website.” Fin. Acct. Found., 2004 Annual
Report 29 (2005). This disclosure is potentially misleading in that (a) the materials are in PDF
(portable data format, meaning secure against digital manipulation) and (b) only the most basic
materials are so available, omitting those addressing the more difficult and uncertain areas of accounting, where legal risks arising from non-compliance are greatest. The website announces
customary assertions of copyright and demands that users assent to their terms, including limitations
on use, copying and distribution.
170. In FASB’s case, the SEC participates alongside it in developing standards, not only in a
supervisory capacity but as an independent standard setter. See, e.g., The Last-In, First-Out Method
of Accounting for Inventories, Securities Act Release No. 6325, Exchange Act Release No. 17912,
23 SEC Docket (July 2, 1981); Adoption of Requirements for Financial Accounting and Reporting
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matters bear examination for their utility both as a complete assessment of
FASB’s status and for lessons applicable to many other contexts in which
private standards are embodied in public law, particularly those following
the semi-strong form route.
2. Economic Incentives
Until SOX, publication sales represented the lion’s share of FASB’s operating revenues. In 2002, before SOX took effect, FASB generated $13.3
million in sales revenue with an additional $3.9 million in revenue from pri171
vate contributions. In 2003, after SOX, FASB received $19.7 million from
fees Congress levied on public companies to cover its entire budget and
ceased accepting private contributions. Yet it continued to sell products,
172
generating $12.6 million in sales. Before SOX, sales proceeds may have
173
been important to provide FASB not only incentives but sustenance; after
174
SOX, such proceeds are unnecessary for either purpose.
3. Non-Economic Incentives
FASB also has non-economic incentives to produce accounting
standards. Unlike PCAOB’s unique statutory production monopoly, SOX
permits FASB competitors to vie for recognition as accounting standard
175
setters. The implicit theory is that competition among standard setters for
recognition is desirable, and that a hierarchy among their pronouncements
can be established, so that any number of potential standard setters could
176
both compete for and gain SEC recognition. This generates incentives for
FASB to produce standards independent of sales from publications or
177
This view is confirmed by FASB’s
copyright-induced incentives.
Practices for Oil and Gas Producing Activities, Securities Act Release No. 5966, Exchange Act
Release No. 15108, 15 SEC Docket 929 (Aug. 31, 1978); SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 102,
75 SEC Docket 890 (July 6, 2001); SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101, 71 SEC Docket 590
(Dec. 3, 1999); SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 1999 WL 1123073 (Aug. 12, 1999). SEC
promulgations would benefit considerably from the free ability to build upon FASB works.
171. Fin. Acct. Found., 2004 Annual Report (2005). Compare FASB’s sales as a percentage of revenue of approximately 76% with AICPA (18%, supra text accompanying note 144) and
the building code-producer in Veeck (33%, supra text accompanying note 69).
172.

Fin. Acct. Found., 2004 Annual Report (2005).

173. As to incentives, compare supra note 141, noting observations that standard setters operated for generations with no judicial awards of copyright protection over their standards that are
embodied in law.
174. Excess FASB revenues in 2003 were used to fund operations of its sister organization,
GASB, discussed infra Section II.C.6.
175. That is the SEC’s interpretation of SOX. See SEC Policy Statement Reaffirming FASB
Status, supra note 111, at n.5.
176. For example, AICPA’s Statement on Auditing Standards No. 69 provides a GAAP hierarchy among existing standards. See supra notes 131, 138, 139; see also supra Section I.D.
177. If recognizing multiple standard setters presents reconciliation or conflict risks then any
number of potential standard setters can vie for SEC recognition, but the SEC ultimately would
designate one.
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application to the SEC for recognition as a statutory standard setter under
178
SOX.
This policy and related competitive incentives also justify concluding
that there is no reason to cement FASB’s leadership position by advantages
that copyright provides. That conclusion extends to derivative works. FASB
competitors could freely use FASB standards to create derivative works,
yielding competitors demonstrating superior capability to produce quality
standards. Far from reducing FASB’s incentives to produce requisite standards, the competition should reinforce them.
4. Standard Setter Independence
A standard setter’s independence can influence the policy perspective
179
with respect to copyright in its works. FASB’s independence hinges on an
important securities law policy matter. SOX expressed concern that FASB’s
independence from the accounting profession was compromised by its prac180
tice of accepting contributions from the profession to fund its operations.
It addressed this concern by fully funding FASB. In doing so, however, it
authorized FASB to use additional revenue sources, including from publication sales, but only if this does not impair its independence, in fact or
181
appearance, in the SEC’s judgment.
FASB’s independence can be influenced by whether and how it sells its
products. One danger is that nominal product purchasers are clandestine
contributors (or may be so perceived). FASB’s pre-SOX practice was to
182
provide complimentary subscriptions to its donors, a practice it ceased
after SOX prohibited it from receiving contributions to preserve independ183
ence from subscribers. Critical to the SEC’s judgment about the effects of
publication sales on FASB independence is whether sales are monopolized
178. It does not appear that any other body applied for recognition—including AICPA. FASB
thus signals that it possesses incentives that others do not. In AICPA’s case, it may have incentives to
try, but in the political climate of the period when SOX was enacted, it had no chance of ordainment. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light
Reform (And It Might Just Work), 35 U. Conn. L. Rev. 915 (2003).
179. Veeck’s dissent made this point in considering the value to a standard setter of revenue
streams from publications sales. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 814–15
(5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Wiener, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003).
180. Before SOX, FASB was funded by a combination of private contributions, including
from the accounting profession, and sales of its publications. For example, in 2002, before SOX,
AICPA contributed $2 per member to support FASB and AICPA boasts approximately 335,000
members. Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 2002–03 Annual Report 13, 27 (2003).
181. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 109(i), 116 Stat. 745 (2002). The
SEC’s public statements authorizing FASB’s funding from congressionally levied fees provides no
indication that the SEC considered the effects of copyright on FASB’s independence. Order Regarding Review of FASB Accounting Support Fee Under Section 109 of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, Securities Act Release No. 8389, Exchange Act Release No. 49290, 82
SEC Docket 669 (Feb. 20, 2004); see also infra text accompanying notes 188–193 (reviewing this
SEC statement in relation to incoherence of the funding system SOX establishes).
182.

Fin. Acct. Found., 2004 Annual Report (2005).

183.

Id.
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or competitive. If copyright is sustained, then FASB is the only source from
which to buy its materials, directly or through licensees. This makes it easy
to disguise contributions as sales. If products are freely available, unusually
high-volume purchases from FASB would appear as red flags of influenceseeking. Accordingly, not recognizing copyright in FASB works advances
184
SOX’s legislative purpose of insulating FASB from parochial influence.
5. Standards Quality
In addition to the compelling policy objectives favoring relinquishing
copyright to create free access for those legally subject to FASB pronouncements (and the public at large), a related policy concerns its effect on
accounting standards. The SEC statement quoted above urging FASB to
relinquish copyright was made in the context of a congressionally mandated
SEC study concerning the quality of U.S. accounting standards. A wide debate erupted after the staggering accounting debacles of the early 2000s
regarding whether FASB’s GAAP is too dense and rule-bound or too general
185
and principles-based. This criticism, which is legitimate, may evidence
skewed incentives to produce greater quantities of standards rather than
standards of superior quality. Taking copyright’s economic incentives out of
186
the equation may thus enhance the quality of FASB’s standards.
Permitting publishers to compete freely could produce considerable additional public benefits, further weighting the public policy balance towards
derecognizing copyright to standards embodied in law using the semi-strong
form route. This step could produce public benefits by promoting competition among providers for superior presentation of materials. Professional
publishers likely are better equipped than trade associations or standard setters to publish materials in beneficial ways, in terms of presentation and
187
distribution. Similarly, freer availability of standards may expose them to
a broader audience inclined to provide criticism that can be necessary to
improve standards quality.
Absence of copyright need not deprive standard setters of rights to publish and sell materials. Subject to independence effects of allowing sales,
official promulgators could enjoy an economic advantage from that status.
For example, when the status of pronouncements is functional law, users
184. The relation among sales, copyright and independence often will be an important factor
in evaluating copyright standards embodied in law. In fact, SOX applies the same SEC-determined
test to the effect of sales on PCAOB’s independence. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107204, § 109, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
185.

See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).

186. This point complements the related point that in a system where successive standard
setters establish GAAP and GAAS, they may need to rely upon and use work of predecessors to
maximize standards quality. See supra Section I.E.
187. A leading example is John Wiley & Sons, which serves as FASB’s licensee and publisher
and publishes well-regarded texts on GAAP and GAAS that are in turn copyrighted by AICPA.
Others include publishers of legal materials: large houses such as Thomson, Reed Elsevier and
Wolters Kluwer and smaller presses such as Anderson Publishing Co., Bureau of National Affairs,
Carolina Academic Press, Law Office Systems and Practicing Law Institute.

CUNNINGHAM PP2 + AC FINAL TYPE.DOC

38

Michigan Law Review

10/10/2005 1:46 PM

[Vol. 104:ppp

require an official text, updated regularly. In intellectual property terms, an
official standard setter’s trademarks or service marks can carry substantial
188
economic value in the marketplace. Accordingly, FASB likely would still
generate revenues from publications (as would PCAOB and perhaps even
AICPA) whether or not related works were protected by copyright.
6. Secondary Incentives: GASB
As noted, while SOX commands funds for 100% of FASB’s budget,
FASB continues to sell products to generate revenues far exceeding its
budget. It uses the excess to fund the standard-setting activities of its sisterorganization, GASB, the accounting standard setter for governmental entities. This use of sales proceeds raises a host of further issues pivoting
around what might be called secondary incentives—that is, a standard setter
may benefit from incentives copyright provides not to produce its own standards but to fund production of standards by others.
In 2003, the Financial Accounting Foundation (overseer of both FASB
and GASB) followed its traditional practice of providing audited financial
statements covering activities of both FASB and GASB. In them, it presented revenues from contributions and sales separately for FASB and
GASB. As SOX requires, the Foundation also prepared separate 2003 finan189
cial statements for FASB. The only source of revenue presented in FASB’s
stand-alone statements is the SOX accounting support fees (of $19.7 mil190
lion, plus $263,000 in services contributed). The statements make no
mention of any sales revenue. The Foundation explained that it reallocated
191
these revenue sources from FASB to itself and to GASB.
This reallocation is difficult to square with SOX, although SOX itself
appears to be self-contradictory. One section of SOX directs that all of
FASB’s budget is to be funded by congressionally levied fees while another
192
section authorizes FASB’s budget to be funded by sales of its publications.
193
It is impossible to reconcile these two provisions. If all of the budget is
paid by fees, what happens to sales revenue? If sales revenue defrays budgetary costs, how can all of the budget be paid by fees? The Foundation
188.

See Karjala, supra note 83.

189.

Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 108(b)(2).

190.

Financial Accounting Standards Board, 2003 Financial Statements 1 (2004).

191.

Supra note 182, at 30.

192. Section 109(c)(1) of SOX states that “all of the budget of the standard setting body referred to [FASB] . . . shall be payable from annual accounting support fees . . . .” Sarbanes-Oxley
Act § 109(c)(1) (emphasis added). Section 109(i) states that “Nothing in this section shall be construed . . . to prevent such organization from utilizing additional sources of revenue for its activities,
such as earnings from publication sales, provided that each additional source of revenue shall not
jeopardize, in the judgment of the [SEC], the actual and perceived independence of such organization.” Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 109(i) (emphasis added).
193. Equally unhelpful is sub-section (f), which states: “The amount of fees collected under
this section for a fiscal year on behalf of . . . the standards setting body . . . shall not exceed the
recoverable budget expenses of the . . . body . . . .” Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 109(f). Recoverable
budget expense may be determined before or after sales revenues are absorbed.
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resolved this contradiction in SOX by reallocating FASB’s revenue from
publication sales to itself and to GASB, and by funding all of FASB’s
budget with congressionally levied fees.
194
Increasing funding for GASB is desirable. The Foundation’s approach
to meeting this goal, however, exposes a complex problem of incentives and
budgeting. GASB may need these funds to provide both incentives and sustenance. Yet the funds are derived from sales of products whose production
requires no incentives (SOX pays for it), by a body (FASB) whose opera195
tions require no funding from copyrighted sales.
The conundrum is due to the SOX funding system, which is incoherent
in two ways. First, public companies must support GASB standards applicable to governmental entities by contributing funds Congress intended to
support FASB. Second, public companies must support FASB standards
applicable not only to them but also to not-for-profit organizations, private
enterprises, and individuals.
This incoherence can be corrected by using the classification scheme
this Article suggests. As to FASB, its promulgations applicable to public
companies should be seen as taking the semi-strong form route into public
law, paid for by public companies, subject to SEC oversight, and therefore
should be treated as in the public domain. FASB promulgations applicable
to other persons should be seen as taking the weak form route into public
law so that FASB can retain copyright in these works (subject to qualifying
conventions guaranteeing access) to recoup from sales the proceeds necessary to provide incentives and sustenance to support this undertaking.
For GASB, three alternatives appear. First, it could be recognized and
funded by statute on terms equivalent to PCAOB, with fees levied on governmental entities to which its standards apply. Under this approach, its
promulgations would take the strong form route into public law for which
no copyright is necessary or appropriate. While this is probably the superior
196
alternative, two other options appear. GASB could be (1) so recognized
and funded on terms equivalent to FASB, so that its promulgations are seen
as taking the semi-strong form route into law with similar consequences or
(2) permitted to retain copyright in its promulgations, and treated as taking
the weak form route into legal recognition (also subject to qualifying conventions guaranteeing access).
The incoherence in SOX’s funding system and the suggested menu of alternatives to resolve it arise, in part, because no one is responsible for
197
making the required classification determinations. That is, in addition to
194. GASB needs both funding and insulation from parochial pressures that occasionally
threaten its existence. See Opinion, GASB Faces the Fight of Its Life, Acct. Today, Jan. 19, 1998.
195.

See supra Section III.C.2.

196. FAF is seeking this route in funding GASB. See Fin. Acct. Found., 2004 Annual
Report (2005). It lacks legal power to order funding; instead, it seeks to persuade governmental
entities to which its accounting standards apply to provide support voluntarily.
197. The SEC approved FASB’s 2004 funding from fees Congress levied on public companies. Order Regarding Review of FASB Accounting Support Fee Under Section 109 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Securities Act Release No. 8389, Exchange Act Release
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the absence of a classification framework for evaluating copyright to standards embodied in law, there is no institutional mechanism for providing
solutions. In the next Part, the classification scheme is generalized and institutional mechanisms are identified to implement it.
III. Governmental Strategy
The evolution in SEC policy concerning recognizing accounting standards promulgated by others shows the range of possible approaches to
implementing such a governmental strategy. Until 1973, the SEC sought to
rely extensively on the private sector, by pointing to AICPA bodies to establish standards; from 1973 through 2002, it strengthened its reliance upon
such bodies and simultaneously bolstered its influence over them. Since
2002, that influence has risen to the congressional level, with SOX establishing and funding PCAOB to promulgate GAAS and defining FASB’s
attributes and funding to establish GAAP.
The SEC’s policy of relying upon such bodies outside the formal federal
budget reflects a governmental off-balance sheet financing strategy. But the
SEC’s experience of increasingly incorporating private bodies into formal
public lawmaking shows the difficulties of achieving regulatory objectives
when regulators lack direct control over the standard-setting process. The
SEC has steadily ratcheted up its power over these bodies, indicating limitations on the regulatory effectiveness of deference to private standard setters.
The SEC’s experience—if not its historical policy—characterizes like efforts of other governmental entities.
All governmental uses of privately promulgated standards are intended,
198
in part, to conserve governmental resources. Government seeks to leverage its regulatory effectiveness and oversight by piggybacking on costs
expended in the private sector. At least in the case of the federal government, it simultaneously seeks to preserve copyright in those privately
199
promulgated standards.
This twofold policy is at war with itself, as the SEC recognized when it
urged FASB to relinquish copyright over its standards in favor of providing
200
free public access. Optimizing leverage necessarily entails reduced copy-

No. 49290, 82 SEC Docket 669 (Feb. 20, 2004). It observed without noting the contradiction that
SOX both provides all of the budget for a standard setter and that a standard setter can generate
revenue from publication sales (subject to preserving its independence). The SEC stated without
explanation that it “considered the interrelation of the operating budgets of the FAF, the FASB and
the Government Accounting Standards Board . . . .” Id. The SEC makes no mention of related effects
on FASB’s independence, standards quality or the funding system’s incoherence. Nor did the SEC
speak to FASB’s pricing policies. Id.
198. E.g., OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 33,8545, 33,8555 (Feb. 19, 1998). Calculating
costs to assess whether to use private standards or to develop regulations internally must address a
variety of costs associated with delegation of functions. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 Duke L.J. 389 (2003).
199.

See OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 33,8545, 33,8555 (Feb. 19, 1998).

200.

See supra text accompanying note 168.
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201

right protection. While these competing objectives cannot easily be reconciled, trade-offs can be crystallized using this Article’s three-class scheme to
202
relate the leverage function to its copyright consequences.
Optimal leverage from using private standard setters occurs by the strategy that minimizes use of governmental resources while maximizing
achievement of regulatory objectives. Resource conservation is maximized
when private standards are used by passing reference, incorporating benefits
of privately produced standards without associated costs. But while this
weak form route maximizes resource conservation, it may not maximize
regulatory objectives. Maximizing regulatory objectives is achieved through
the strong form route standards take into law, by formal designation of a
statutory standard setter; optimization is achieved when costs are met by a
governmentally directed function, but not from governmental revenues. Intermediate leveraging occurs through the semi-strong form route.
Apart from leverage, governmental strategy of embodying private standards in public law using the semi-strong form route confronts two
203
administrative law constraints. First, constitutional principles nearly as old
as those prohibiting copyrighting judicial opinions limit governmental dele204
gation of lawmaking functions to private parties. There may be some
legitimate room for permitting private parties to perform lawmaking func205
206
tions. But the assignment poses considerable questions of legitimacy
207
and implicates transcendent issues of democracy. Second, a powerful
norm pulsing through the administrative lawmaking function requires publication of regulatory promulgations in the spirit of open government and
208
public access to law. Federal lawmakers respect these animating themes
201. Achieving the objective of copyright preservation is possible in the weak form route, is
not possible when using the strong form route and remains difficult in the semi-strong form route.
202. My denomination of the governmental strategy as providing regulatory leverage receives
the more stinging cast of an “aggravated free lunch” in Malla Pollack, Purveyance and Power, or
Over-Priced Free Lunch: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Ally of the Takings Clause in the
Public’s Control of Government, 30 Sw. U. L. Rev. 1, 134–35 (2000).
203. These do not arise in the strong form route when a promulgator is a functional lawmaker
and follows prescribed publication requirements nor in the weak form route when there is no pretense of lawmaking and associated materials are or are not made widely available.
204.

See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).

205. A middle ground of private participation in regulatory practice is called negotiated rulemaking. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 561–570); Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 Geo. L.J. 1 (1981).
206. See David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 Ind. L.J. 647
(1986); David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 371 (2003).
207. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., et al., Administrative Law and Process 10–28 (3d ed.
1999). To be distinguished from governmental delegation to private parties is the more contestable
issue of legislative delegation to the executive branch or to administrative agencies. E.g., Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
208. A good specific example is that SOX requires the SEC to approve all PCAOB standards
using traditional administrative rulemaking processes beginning with release for public comment
and concluding with publication in the Federal Register. See supra note 115. More general examples, all codified in the Administrative Procedure Act, include the following statutes: Freedom of
Information Act of 1967, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)–(3) (2000); Federal Advisory Committee Act of
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by comporting with due process footings upon which such laws are
209
210
founded. Steps include publication of adopted laws.
To illuminate governmental choices in establishing policy, the following
discusses various sources and processes used to embody standards in law,
sorted according to this Article’s three-class scheme. It also proposes implementation mechanisms to facilitate governmental navigation of these
trade-offs. For the federal government, this involves appointing an administrative authority to serve a channeling function when receiving proposals
from federal governmental entities to embody private standards in public
211
law. Analogous mechanisms would be used at state and local governmen212
tal levels.
A. Strong Form
When a governmental authority promulgates standards for embodiment
in law, no question of copyright arises, either because the standards assume
the status of legislative enactment per se as a matter of due process (constitutional law) or because of the government works doctrine (the Copyright
Act). Hundreds of federal agencies promulgate standards of various kinds
routinely. A prominent example is the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, created in 1901 as a non-regulatory federal agency within the
Commerce Department to promote standards in a broad cross-section of
213
fields. The National Institute of Standards and Technology makes its website and its content widely accessible, noting that most “information
presented on these pages is considered public information and may be dis214
tributed or copied.”
In turn, federal law requires copies of governmentally generated standards to be deposited with the National Technical Information Service
1972, Pub L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972); Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552b (2000). See Pierce, supra note 207, at 420–23, 476–85.
209.

See Pierce, supra note 207, at 226.

210.

See Administrative Procedure Act, § 552(a)(1)(D) (2000).

211. For reasons of convenience described below, the Director of the Federal Register is likely
best suited to assume this function for the federal government.
212. Coordination among governmental entities can be arranged through an array of existing
bodies engaged in kindred cooperative undertakings. A leading example is the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”), an organization created and funded by
states which produces hundreds of model or uniform legal codes or standards, including the Uniform Commercial Code, the Uniform Probate Code, and Uniform Rules of Evidence. Also helpful
can be the American Bar Association, a private professional association of lawyers and producer of
such works as the Model Business Corporation Act and the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. Other useful associations include Council of State Governments, National Conference of
State Legislatures, National Association of Counties, National City Government Resource Link, and
U.S. Conference of Mayors.
213. Perhaps the most popular contribution of the National Institute of Standards and Technology is the Baldridge National Quality Program, which manages the annual Malcolm Baldridge
National Quality Award to recognize performance excellence and quality achievement.
214. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Disclaimer Statement,
http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/disclaim.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2005).
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215

(“NTIS”). This Service is the federal government’s clearinghouse for sci216
entific and technical information produced by or for federal agencies.
Information includes results from scientific and engineering research, as
well as economic and market information relevant to business and indus217
try. The NTIS catalogues, organizes, and disseminates resulting materials
(totaling some 3 million items) to business, industry, academia and the general public. According to its website, the NTIS “receives no appropriations
and sustains its operations through the sale of such documents to the public
and by providing related information-dissemination services to other Fed218
eral agencies.”
One step removed from direct governmental production of standards is
the anointment of a designated standard setter to produce standards embodied in law using the strong-form route. To date, PCAOB appears to be the
sole example of a governmental standard setter Congress designates as re219
siding outside the formal boundaries of the federal government. Internal
220
federal standard setters abound and numerous federal corporations exist,
but the latter do not generally produce standards embodied in law as
PCAOB does. PCAOB’s public-body characteristics, moreover, alleviate
concerns that congressional delegations of lawmaking power to it are un221
constitutional or illegitimate and PCAOB follows to a tee the publication
and other requirements necessary to the legitimacy of administrative agency
222
lawmaking.
Despite absence of federal PCAOB-equivalents, the PCAOB model may
223
be appealing to governmental agencies. The SEC struggled for years with
224
AICPA in developing auditing standards that the SEC preferred; SOX presented the ultimate showdown of replacing AICPA with PCAOB. Other
federal agencies may elicit superior standard setting from private organizations by threatening to persuade Congress to follow a similar route in their
regulatory domain. If necessary funding sources can be obtained outside the
federal budget as with PCAOB, this can be an ideal way to generate standards

215.

15 U.S.C. 3704b-2 (2000); see also 15 C.F.R. pt. 1180 (2005).

216.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1151–1157, § 3704b (2000).

217.

15 C.F.R. § 1180.2 (2005).

218. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Section 515 Information Quality Standards, http://www.ntis.gov/new/quality.asp?loc=7-2-0. (last visited Sept. 15, 2005).
219. See supra Section III.A. At the state level, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) exhibits the strong form route of standards embodied in law.
NCCUSL is created and funded by states for the purpose of drafting laws destined for state-adoption
on a wide range of subjects from administrative law to zoning. Cf. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 595 (1995); James J. White, Ex
Proprio Vigore, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 2096 (1991).
220.

See 31 U.S.C. § 9101(2)–(3) (2000).

221.

See supra Section II.A.2.

222.

See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995).

223.

See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 196 (suggested approach for GASB).

224.

See supra text accompanying notes 123–124 (SEC interaction with ISB).
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while retaining regulatory control. Such an approach would also substantially eliminate difficulties associated with copyright to standards embodied
in law.
B. Weak Form
While Dr. Samuel Johnson quipped that no one but a blockhead writes,
225
except for money, the volumes of materials published suggest the cynicism in this hyperbole. The vast majority of such materials likely would be
produced even absent copyright incentives to do so (so long as attribution
norms are maintained). Nevertheless, copyright is designed to provide incrementally requisite incentives—not quite rewards—for this labor and its
utilitarian underpinnings justify preserving such incentives, if only to promote production of the minority of materials for which copyright is an
inducement. Thus, passing references to these materials, even to contribute
significantly to deciding a judicial case or prescribing a legislative or regulatory policy, should respect such copyright.
Examples of how such private materials may be embodied in law following the weak form route abound. Two appeared in the cases discussed in
Part I: (1) state legislators may reference valuation books on insured prop226
erty as a basis for establishing insurance loss payouts and (2) a federal
agency may reference medical coding systems as a basis for processing re227
imbursement requests. In these examples, governmental leverage is
exploited by avoiding costs to generate standards. Preserving copyright
promotes incentives for numerous standard setters to vie for regulatory recognition, helping the regulator to a menu of alternatives. Provided materials
are sufficiently available and recognized to justify such invocation, public
domain concerns of due process and access diminish to the vanishing point.
Similarly, the Practice Management court gave examples of standards
228
referenced in federal regulations. All illustrate the weak form route standards take into law, akin to the classic case of judicial references to Gray’s
Anatomy. Thus copyright is not vitiated by: (1) federal court rules requiring
attorneys to follow The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation, published
229
by a group of law school journals; (2) an agency limiting reimbursable
dental benefits to those listed in the reference work Current Dental Termi230
nology, published by the American Dental Association; or (3) an agency
limiting reimbursement for medical costs associated with mental disorders
listed in Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published by

225.

3 Boswell’s Life of Johnson 19 (G.B. Hill & L.F. Powell rev. ed., 1934) (1791).

226.

CCC Info. Servs. Inc. v. MacLean Hunter Mkt. Rep., Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994).

227. Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997), amended
by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952 (1998).
228.

Practice Mgmt., 121 F.3d at 519 n.5.

229.

E.g., 11th Cir. R. 28-1(k).

230.

32 C.F.R. § 199.13(e)(2) (2004).
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231

the American Psychiatric Association. In each case, constitutional and
prudential limitations assure related access. Such materials would not be
entitled to such recognition unless they were readily available for access.
When such materials supply a more general basis of legal obligations,
additional qualifying conventions are necessary. Part II’s discussion of
AICPA’s role in promulgating accounting standards for public companies
illustrated this. Weak form references to these standards may not justify vitiating related copyright, but as sources of functional law, qualifying doctrines
of fair use, compulsory licensing, or regulations mandating access are necessary to meet due process requirements. Attention to the role of rights to
create derivative works can also be important. At present, however, no
mechanism exists for establishing these administrative necessities, except on
an ad hoc basis through federal adjudication.
C. Semi-Strong Form
Between the relatively easy classes of cases arising under the strong and
weak form routes standards take into law are the more difficult cases following the semi-strong form route. In this context, a private-sector cottage
industry promulgates standards, to which copyright’s incentive structures
may or may not contribute. Participants include organizations pursuing
232
broad-gauged standard-setting and dissemination efforts and specialized
233
industry standard setters.
How lawmakers embody standards produced by such organizations into
public law varies. Some governmental authorities affirmatively encourage
agencies to adopt private standards. Congress did so for the federal govern234
ment in the National Technology and Transfer Act, directing agencies to
adopt private sector standards whenever practicable and appropriate; executive
branch implementing guidance directed agencies to preserve copyright in such
235
standards when embodied in law. Agencies follow a regulated and routine

231.

32 C.F.R. § 199.2 (2004).

232. The National Information Standards Organization (“NISO”) website boasts: “Standards
are big business today and NISO has many partners in the standards area. The latest U.S. directory
of standards developers lists over 700 standards developers responsible for over 90,000 national
standards.” NISO, Standards: Putting Innovation to Work, http://www.niso.org (last visited Jun. 12,
2005). NISO identifies ANSI as the principal US standards-federation in that it accredits other standard setters (some 400 of them, including NISO). It also identifies the American Society for Testing
Materials as sponsoring 128 standards committees for industry. NISO, The Standards World,
http://www.niso.org/world/index.html (last visited Jun. 12, 2005).
233. ANSI and numerous other organizations filed amicus briefs in Practice Management
and Veeck. On its website, ANSI markets products promulgated by more than 60 standard-setting
organizations. Am. Nat’l Standards Inst., eStandards Store: SDO Developers, http://
webstore.ansi.org/ansidocstore/sdo_developers.asp (last visited Jun. 12, 2005).
234.

Pub. L. No. 104-113, 110 Stat. 783 (1996).

235.

OMB Circular A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 33,8545, 33,8555 (Feb. 19, 1998).
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236

process when doing so. This process differs somewhat from traditional
administrative rulemaking, particularly as to publication requirements.
In traditional administrative rulemaking, agencies are required to publish
237
resulting promulgations in the Federal Register. When embodying private
standards in public law, however, Congress authorizes agencies to sidestep
the publication requirement using an exception known as incorporation by
238
reference. In particular, the Freedom of Information Act and implementing
regulations direct that agencies incorporate copyrighted standards by refer239
ence into agency regulations. Rather than publish embodied standards in
the Federal Register in full, agencies simply refer to them.
To be eligible for incorporation by reference under the statute, an agency
must determine that standards are reasonably available to the class of per240
sons affected by the publication. Agencies must then submit proposed
regulations to the Office of the Federal Register, and regulations only become effective when published in the Federal Register. The Director of the
Federal Register is charged with reviewing such submissions for approval or
241
disapproval. The Director’s review includes a determination that materials
incorporated by reference are reasonably available.
Reasonable availability does not require that materials be free. In fact,
242
while some standard setters do not require payment for reproduction, it is
common for them to charge fees to defray associated publication and over243
head costs. They tend to follow the approach the National Technical
Information Service uses by charging fees to recoup associated production
costs (likely to be far more essential than copyright royalties to generate
production). However, nothing prevents standard setters from charging the
monopoly rates that copyright law facilitates (as FASB does, with the SEC’s
244
blessing ) or limiting third-party creation of derivative works. Nor does the

236. See, e.g., Standards for Business Practices of Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines, 61 Fed.
Reg. 39,053, 39,055 (Jul. 26, 1996); III FERC Stats. & Regs. Regulations Preambles ¶ 31,039 (Jul.
17, 1996) [hereinafter, FERC Order].
237. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (2000). The process that SOX
directs the SEC and PCAOB to follow in PCAOB standard setting illustrates legitimate traditional
practice. See supra note 115.
238.

See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D).

239.

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2000); 1 C.F.R. 51.7(4) (2005); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2002).

240.

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2000); 1 C.F.R. § 51.7(4) (2005).

241. See Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., Federal Register Document Drafting
Handbook, 6-1 (1998), available at http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/document_drafting_
handbook/document_drafting_handbook_faq.html (last visited Jun. 12, 2005).
242.

E.g., FERC Order, supra note 236.

243. Id. (citing ANSI, Why There Is a Charge for Standards and Standards Information,
http://www.ansi.org/why-chrg.html (last visited Jun. 12, 2005) (“explaining why charges need to be
assessed for standards even if obtained electronically, with no publishing costs”)); see also ANSI,
Why Charge for Standards, http://www.ansi.org/help/charge_standards.aspx?menuid=help (last
visited Oct. 5, 2005)..
244.

See supra note 192 (SEC approval of FASB’s budget).
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process require lawmakers to publish resulting standards according to usual
administrative practice.
The same process—with associated infirmities—applies when federal
245
statutes direct agencies to incorporate private standards. To illustrate, the
Consumer Product Safety Act directs the Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) to use private standards when possible and consistent
246
with regulatory objectives. CPSC adopted regulations governing the testing of bicycle helmets that incorporated, by reference, standards
247
promulgated by private organizations. Regulations indicate that the Direc248
tor of the Federal Register approved incorporation by reference. Following
the Director’s guidelines, CPSC states the name and addresses of the standards organizations from which copies of these standards are available and
that they are available for copying from the Secretary of the CPSC. They are
not published in the Federal Register.
State and local governmental entities follow various processes to em249
body standards in law. This is illustrated by the building code cases. Codes
were not referenced in passing but adopted formally by legislative bodies
250
with binding effects. No additional legislative action appears to have been
taken to promote access or address copyright consequences. This inaction
left the conflict between public domain and copyright incentives for resolution by federal courts institutionally incapable of providing a comprehensive
251
public policy framework. In fact, neither the BOCA court nor any of the
three opinions in Veeck recognized that vitiating copyright raises questions
252
under the takings clause of the Constitution.
Nor does it appear that any governmental authority recognized the consequences of Veeck for other standards within its scope. Consider standards
adopted by the Department of Housing and Urban Development for manufactured housing. Following procedures established in the Administrative
Procedure Act and others summarized above, it incorporated by reference
model codes of the Council of American Building Officials and the National
253
Under Veeck, this embodiment vitiates
Fire Protection Association.
245. In legislation directing agencies to adopt private standards, Congress should specify
copyright consequences by directing that a given standard setter make its works freely available,
subject them to compulsory licensing or otherwise provide ex ante solutions to avoid the conundrum
otherwise created.
246.

See Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2056(b)(1) (2000).

247.

16 C.F.R. § 1203.3 (2004).

248.

Id. § 1203.3(b).

249. See supra Section I.C.1; see also Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791
(5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003); BOCA, 628 F.2d 730, 732 (1st Cir.
1980).
250.

Veeck, 293 F.3d at 793; BOCA, 628 F.2d at 730.

251.

See supra text accompanying notes 90–92.

252. The CCC court (the used car valuation handbook case) recognized this in passing. See
CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Rep., Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 73 n.29 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing N.J.
Admin. Code 11:3-10.4 (1988); 11 N.Y. Admin. Code § 216.7(c) (1990)).
253.

See 24 C.F.R. §§ 200.926b, 200 app. A, 3280.801 (2004).
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copyright. But no mechanism exists to make this determination and no
254
framework exists to govern it.
D. Administration
Alternative institutional arrangements may be designed to facilitate clas255
sifying standards embodied in law for copyright and lawmaking purposes.
For the federal government, an existing central participant in the embodiment process is the Director of the Federal Register, who oversees the
process and can be assigned the additional task of classification. State and
local governmental authorities would follow similar procedures in confor256
mity with respective administrative and legal infrastructures.
The Director of the Federal Register would be charged with evaluating
the route taken, as weak, semi-strong or strong. The Director would determine the copyright effect of embodiment, applying the factors discussed in
257
this Article. In all strong form cases, no copyright may be granted. In
other cases, classification analysis and copyright effects would proceed as
follows.
In weak form cases, copyright may be maintained, so long as the Director confirms that designated materials are widely available (this is an
evaluation the Director makes under existing practice). If not, the Director
should suggest to the submitting agency that it require access by regula258
tion. Failing this, the Director must determine whether compulsory
254. Federal judges cite cascade effects on other works when upholding challenged copyright
to standards embodied in law. See, e.g., Veeck, 293 F.3d at 806 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting); Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1997); CCC, 44 F.3d at 74;
supra text accompanying notes 40–41, 47, 59. Such judicial reticence is prudent as a matter of federal court competence; absence of a policy framework for resolving it is a national regulatory
abomination.
255. Leading candidates include the Librarian of Congress, the Copyright Office, Copyright
Royalty Judges, or the Director of the Federal Register. The Librarian of Congress and the Copyright Office possess requisite expertise concerning the scope of copyright protection. See Liu, supra
note 91, at 147–66. Copyright Royalty Judges possess expertise concerning compulsory licensing
arrangements. As federal law’s gatekeeper, however, the Director of the Federal Register is best
positioned to provide general channeling functions. Accordingly, as discussed in the following text,
an effective approach would repose overall administration in the Director of the Federal Register,
with specific directives upon it and these other government organs to coordinate particular aspects.
256. Virtually every state has adopted an administrative procedure act, ultimately modeled on
the federal version, although derived from model codes promulgated by NCCUSL. See Ronald A.
Cass, Administrative Law: Cases and Materials 5 (4th ed. 2002) (This handily illustrates the
need for standard setters to have the ability to prepare derivative works.).
257. To recapitulate, key factors are free public access (emphasizing copyright’s thin protective scope for standards) and incentives (emphasizing quality, not quantity, and promoting standard
setter independence). The shape of these factors will vary with a case’s particulars, such as government’s role in production (including under the government works doctrine and its independent
contractor component), production incentives other than copyright, and the appropriateness of alternative qualifying conventions.
258. This suggestion can embolden an agency to pressure standard setters in ways the agency
otherwise may hesitate to do. This can be useful in both negotiated rulemaking, supra note 201, and
in the more general contexts in which agencies seek cordial relationships with those they oversee,
including standard setters. See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Tran-
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licensing is necessary. In this determination, the Director would coordinate
with the Librarian of Congress, the Copyright Office, and Copyright Royalty Judges. These bodies are currently required to participate in
administering the Copyright Act’s existing compulsory licensing arrange259
ments. All possess expertise to guide the Director in making necessary
determinations.
In semi-strong form cases, the Director should make two procedural determinations, likely already required but worth emphasizing. First, to police
delegation, agencies must exercise judgment and reach an independent determination of appropriateness as to private standards they embody in public
law, to respect basic concepts reposing lawmaking functions in lawmakers.
Second, to promote legitimacy, the Director should scrutinize incorporation
by reference practices to concord with due process norms pervading tradi260
261
tional administrative processes, particularly concerning publication. In
certain circumstances, the agency mandate to make materials publicly available may not be met by incorporation by reference but may require
262
publication in the Federal Register.
In semi-strong form cases, the Director must make substantive determinations as to whether copyright is derecognized. If so, the government must
determine whether, and to what extent, embodiment constitutes a taking
under the Constitution. Not all embodiments constitute takings, particularly
263
for standards whose authors intend them for this purpose. Such standard
setters effectively grant an implied license to governmental entities to embody
264
the standards in law. License scope includes permitting citizens to use such
265
works, negating takings claims. Many embodiments that are takings will
scending the Deregulation Debate 199–203 (1992). For example, the SEC urges FASB to
make its standards freely available, supra text accompanying note 168, but to maintain a cordial
working relationship hesitates to mandate this result. If the Director of the Federal Register tells the
SEC that it believes such a measure is necessary, the SEC can pass this on to FASB as a sympathetic
goodwill ambassador rather than heavy-handed regulator.
259. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 114, 115, 118, 119 (2005) (establishing compulsory
licensing arrangements for various contexts); id. § 801 (effective May 31, 2005) (prescribing participation of these actors in administering such arrangements); see supra note 155 (discussing
compulsory licensing).
260.

See Pierce, supra note 207, at 226.

261. Norms of publication and availability have assumed amplified importance in the digital
age when dissemination of materials has become so much easier than historically was the case. See,
e.g., Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, §§ 3-22,
110 Stat. 3049 (1996).
262.

E.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (2000).

263.

See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).

264. Cf. Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 807, 817 n.59 (5th Cir. 2002)
(en banc), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003) (citing Christopher M. v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch.
Dist., 933 F.2d 1285, 1292 (5th Cir. 1991)).
265. It may be tempting to attribute alteration of copyright to standards embodied in law primarily to copyright doctrine and only secondarily to governmental action. Copyright law’s merger doctrine
negates copyright protection when an idea and its expression merge—without regard to why—and this
could include embodiment in law. See Pollack, supra note 202. While this analysis is credible, it essentially ignores the undeniable fact that government action caused copyright’s merger doctrine to trigger
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amount to taking a relatively modest property interest. After all, under
copyright doctrine, the scope of protection provided to standards is thin,
267
even before embodiment in law.
For such evaluations, the Director would follow existing procedures
governing governmental takings, specifically those denominated as regula268
tory takings. Under existing law, administrative agencies are empowered
to exercise judgment concerning takings rights, claims, and proceedings,
subject to judicial oversight. In the proposed framework, the Director would
require each agency to make such a determination but would also have de
novo review over agency judgments. Similar to weak form cases, the Director of the Federal Register would consult with the Librarian of Congress, the
Copyright Office, and Copyright Royalty Judges in reaching determinations.
Directorial decisions would remain subject to judicial review for adequacy
269
and constitutionality, as under existing law.
In all cases, the Director also must address the question of derivative
works. That is, can government or third parties freely revise standards embodied in law, and subject them to copyright alteration, without the standard
270
setter’s permission? This latitude is an important factor in limiting copyright to standards embodied in law, as it facilitates producing standards of
higher quality. Accordingly, it must be possible to permit this in appropriate
circumstances. A standard setter’s reasonable objections can be addressed
by negotiation between it and the Director, bearing in mind the framework
271
this Article contributes. Negotiations would occur when discussing other
consequences, whether establishing terms of compulsory licensing arrangements, evaluating the nature and measurement of takings, or considering the
need and scope of any regulations mandating access.
Modest legislative change would be necessary to create the administrative scheme contemplated, principally assigning responsibilities and
its vitiating effects. The relative causal weight of these factors likely varies with circumstances and
participants would be entitled to negotiate over the issue.
266.

See supra Section I.D.

267. See supra Section I.D. Analysis using the idea-expression distinction, for example, indicates thin protection of standards because they tend to address ideas expressible in relatively few
ways. See supra text accompanying notes 81–84. Likewise, multiple prongs of the fair use doctrine
point to an expansive scope of fair use, including the nature of standards as factual, the uses of them
for training and compliance, and vying in the marketplace of ideas for embodiment in law. See
supra text accompanying notes 85–88. Thin copyright protection can nevertheless be of considerable value. The key point is that measuring that value must account for the particular scope of
protection at stake.
268. See David A. Westbrook, Administrative Takings: A Realist Perspective on the Practice
and Theory of Regulatory Takings Cases, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 717 (1999).
269. E.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999); Yee
v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992); see generally Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc.,
293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003); BOCA, 628 F.2d 730, 732
(1st Cir. 1980).
270.

See Karjala, supra note 83, at 502 n.255.

271. Delineation and evaluation of all potentially relevant fact patterns potentially arising
would require at least one entirely separate article, but the framework this Article contributes should
be sufficient to define reasonable reference points for such negotiations.
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defining the framework. First, the Federal Register Act would be amended
to require the Director of the Federal Register to perform the proposed func272
tions, in consultation with the other designated bodies. Second, the
Copyright Act would be amended to limit copyright’s exclusive rights in
accordance with the mandate so imposed on the Director, along lines con273
templated by this Article’s three-part framework. Third, the Copyright Act
would be amended to direct cooperation by the Librarian of Congress, the
Copyright Office, and Copyright Royalty Judges with the Director of the
274
Federal Register to enable satisfying statutory duties.
E. Loose Ends
Potential implementation challenges this proposal faces are dwarfed by
the public access and publication considerations that government’s leverage
strategy creates but previously has ignored or hidden from public view.
Moreover, implementation challenges likely appear more substantial than
they are. Several issues illustrate, suggesting a variety of loose ends rather
than substantial hurdles.
First, consider a standard setter’s continuing rights to control use. That
is, should a standard setter be required to accept a governmental embodiment or have rights to withdraw standards to prevent embodiment? While
this seems a difficult question conceptually, as a practical matter it should be
272.

New section 1512 of the Federal Register Act, 44 U.S.C., could be added as follows:

Section 1512. Standards Embodied in Law. The Director of the Federal Register shall review
all standards proposed to be incorporated by reference for publication in the Federal Register
to determine the effects of such embodiment in law on associated copyrights. The Director
shall establish by regulation a framework for making such determinations having appropriate
regard for the author, the work, those affected, and balancing the need for public access with
the need to provide appropriate incentives for production under copyright law. In promulgating
and carrying out such regulations, the Director shall consult with the Librarian of Congress,
the Copyright Office and Copyright Royalty Judges to obtain expert guidance.

Legislative history may refer to scholarly contributions such as this Article and other sources
to guide governmental actors in fulfilling statutory duties.
273. The Copyright Act’s limitations on exclusive rights currently appear in 17 U.S.C.
§§ 108–122, so a new § 123 could be added as follows:
Section 123. Limitations on exclusive rights: Standards embodied in law. Notwithstanding any
other provisions of this Title, (1) no copyright shall be recognized in any standards embodied
in law promulgated by or on behalf of the United States government or any agency or instrumentality thereof and (2) copyright to other standards embodied in law shall be limited in
accordance with regulations promulgated by the Director of the Federal Register pursuant to
44 U.S.C. § 1512.

274. The Copyright Act’s directives covering these bodies in administering existing compulsory licensing arrangements appear in 17 U.S.C. § 801 (effective May 31, 2005), with crossreferences to the Copyright Act’s sections imposing such arrangements (§§ 111, 114, 115, 118 &
119) (2000). So amendments would add a cross-reference to newly created § 123, supra note 273,
and also provide as follows:
Section 801 (as amended). Coordination with Director of the Federal Register. The Librarian
of Congress, the Copyright Office and Copyright Royalty Judges shall provide expert guidance
to the Director of the Federal Register to enable the Director to discharge statutory responsibilities set forth in 44 U.S.C. § 1512 as contemplated by § 123 of this Title.
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of limited significance. Most organizations whose standards are embodied in
law seek this result and should eagerly cooperate. For others, difficult remaining issues are no more acute than in the absence of institutional
mechanisms to resolve them.
Second, standards embodied in law do not necessarily remain embodied
in law forever. A governmental authority may embody a standard in law at
one time and later announce that meeting it is no longer legally required.
This occurs, for example, when FASB promulgates an accounting standard
275
that supercedes a previously applicable AIPCA standard. Such withdrawal
should revive copyright in such works to the same extent that general principles of copyright law provide. The justification for altering copyright is
embodiment in law and the work’s removal from embodiment justifies reversing the alteration. While so returning such works to copyright protection
can pose intriguing complexities, the stakes as a practical matter should be
low. The value of such a copyright would be near zero in all but the rare
cases where some archival value endured.
Third, classifying commentary accompanying standards embodied in
law can present challenges. For example, FASB accounting standards
adopted by majority vote sometimes include separate opinions from dissent276
ing members. The best way to think about associated copyright effects is
by analogy to dissenting judicial opinions. These inform law’s shape, even if
they do not constitute law. So for reasons akin to those applicable to other
legal materials, they are in the public domain.
Fourth and finally, does embodiment in law of private standards render
them law so that their interpretation involves the practice of law within the
meaning of state regulation of lawyers? If so, then only lawyers qualified to
practice in a given jurisdiction would be authorized to engage in this activity. In the case of accounting standards embodied in law, a tempting
implication is that accounting becomes lawyering. Despite the temptation,
boundaries clarify professional domains in this and numerous other contexts. Distinctions do not classify materials as legal or activities as the
practice of law (this is to tilt at windmills) but denominate them as the authorized or unauthorized practice of law. Accountants and others
interpreting standards embodied in law are engaged in the authorized prac277
tice of law. Treating private standards embodied in public law according to
this Article’s analytical framework thus should not raise complex problems
otherwise associated with non-lawyers engaging in the practice of law.

275.

See supra text accompanying note 139.

276. See Wanda A. Wallace, Contrarians or Soothsayers, CPA J., Dec. 2001 (examining 145
dissenting opinions from FASB standards expressed in its 28-year life and noting how these can be
“extremely informative” and sometimes emerge years later as majority stances).
277. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Out-of-State Attorney Fee Forfeiture, 8 Cardozo L. Rev.
1191, 1193–94 & n.25 (1987).
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Conclusion
As a matter of national policy, Congress encourages governmental leveraging of regulatory functions by embodying privately promulgated
standards in public law, the executive branch amplifies the policy to include
protecting copyright in such private standards, and administrative agencies
dutifully fulfill these mandates. State and local governments follow suit. The
few federal courts that have addressed the consequences of this widespread
practice contribute limited guidance, in part because the judicial branch can
respond only in ex post cases and controversies.
Despite governmental ambitions, no one is accountable for evaluating
issues of public access to such materials, which ultimately hinge on copyright law and pose subsidiary issues of administrative law. The case of
accounting standards illustrates the many ways standards become embodied
in law and resulting trade-offs. These illustrations—and the broader class of
which they are part—show need to repose decisionmaking authority and
accountability in governmental officials to make classification determinations and administer related copyright consequences. This Article
contributes a framework for evaluation and nominates designated officials to
278
perform these increasingly critical functions.

278. Drafts of this Article bore the title: “Who Owns Accounting Standards?” The answer:
they are part of the commons, mostly. Under the Article’s analysis, no one owns copyrights to any
PCAOB standard or any FASB standard applicable to public companies; the public owns a right to
compel fair licensing of AICPA standards as well as an expansive scope of fair use. Easy answers to
such questions are elusive. Cf. Ghosh, supra note 30, at 655 (reporting the following aftermath of
Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (footnotes omitted):
An illustration of the stakes is provided by the facts surrounding the case of Peter Veeck. In
June 2002, visitors to the Regional Web site, a forum for discussing and sharing the local law
of Northern Texas and Southern Oklahoma, were confronted with the question “Who Owns
the Law?” in bold red lettering. In equally bold lettering, the Web site provided the answer:
“YOU DO!”

Not quite. The questions in the quotation and the draft’s original title are richer rhetorically
than analytically. No one owns law or accounting standards. Questions concern rights to control
access, to copy and to improve law or standards derivatively.
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